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RACING TOWARDS THE TOP?: The Impact of
Cross-Listings and Stock Market Competition
on International Corporate Governance
by John C. Coffee, Jr.*
Introduction
Today, there are an estimated 150 securities exchanges trading stocks around the world.1
Tomorrow (or at least within the reasonably foreseeable future), this number is likely to shrink
radically. Indeed, this was the U.S. experience at the beginning of the 20th Century when over one
hundred securities exchanges in the United States either consolidated or simply shut down, as
improved communications and transportation systems lowered the informational cost barriers that
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1

For this estimate, see “Vision Test: Nasdaq’s Drive to Build Global Exchange Hits
Some Major Potholes,” The Wall Street Journal, June 25, 2001 at C-1 (hereinafter
cited as “Vision Test”). The term “exchange” is defined in Section 3(a)(1) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The actual functions performed by an “exchange”
have been the subject of much academic writing. See Ruben Lee, WHAT IS AN
EXCHANGE? The Automation, Management and Regulation of Financial Markets
(1998). For purposes of this article, neither the statutory definition of an exchange
nor the legal differences among exchanges and other market centers, such as
electronic communications systems (“ECNs”), is important, and the term
“exchange” will be used in its ordinary sense of a market center.
1

had sustained them. 2 At the beginning of the 21st Century, the two great forces reshaping the
contemporary world - - globalization and technology - - appear to be forcing a similar
consolidation. 3 Because globalization has lowered the barriers to cross-border capital flows,
including in particular traditional restrictions on foreign investments in domestic stocks, and
because technology has made instantaneous information flows feasible, securities markets can now
compete on a global basis that never previously was possible. As a result, issuers, particularly
those in emerging economies, have a choice of markets on which to list their securities and raise
equity capital.
Predictably, once this competition begins, a natural consequence will be a wave of
mergers, consolidations, and related alliances among securities markets.4 But where does this

2

During the 19th Century, approximately 250 different stock exchanges were formed
in the U.S., with all major cities (and many lesser ones) possessing at least one
exchange. See R.C. Michie, THE LONDON AND NEW YORK STOCK
EXCHANGES: 1850-1914 (1987) at 167. As late as 1900, over 100 stock
exchanges were still functioning in the United States. See Marshall Blume, Jeremy
Siegel, and Dan Rothenberg, REVOLUTION ON WALL STREET (1993) at 30.
Their survival into the 20th Century was a direct function of the high cost of longdistance communications and the both costly and cumbersome process of
settlement, which required physical delivery of the stock certificates. Id.
Technological innovations in the late 19th Century (most notably, the telephone and
the stock ticker and earlier the telegraph) reduced these cost barriers and resulted
in more efficient national exchanges absorbing or eliminating smaller local
exchanges.

3

The impact of stock migration and cross-listings has been clearest on exchanges in
emerging markets. In this world, the migration of leading companies to
international exchanges has drained liquidity from local markets and made their
viability uncertain. See Stijn Claessens, Daniela Klingebeil, and Sergio L.
Schmukler, Explaining the Migration of Stocks from Emerging Economies to
International Centers (World Bank Working Paper 2002). See also text and notes
infra at notes 44 to 53.

4

This process is well underway. For reviews of recent developments, see Norman
Poser, The Stock Exchanges of the United States and Europe: Automation,
2

process end? Many who have studied this new competition have assumed that the winners (or at
least the survivors) in this consolidation process will be those who can offer the greatest liquidity,
or the lowest trading costs, or the most advanced technology. 5 Some believe that this competition
will inherently result in a “winner-takes-all” contest that will leave only a few large pools of
liquidity in major international financial centers.6 The premise here is that “liquidity attracts
liquidity,”7 and thus larger markets should drain order flow and liquidity from smaller markets,
ultimately leaving them hollowed out shells.
Few have focused, however, on the impact of this new competition on corporate
governance. Yet, because the cross-border competition among securities markets typically
involves markets operating under different regulatory regimes, an inherent regulatory competition

Globalization and Consolidation, 22 U. Penn. J. of Int’l. Eco. L. 497 (2001);
Alberto Cybo-Ottone, Carmine DiNoia and Maurizio Murgia, “Recent
Developments in the Structure of Securities Markets,” in Robert Litan and Anthony
Santomero (eds.), BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON FINANCIAL
SERVICES 2000 (2000) 223-282; Stijn Claessens, Daniela Klingbeil, and Sergin
Schmukler, supra note 3.
5

This short list does not exhaust the ways in which market centers can compete. For
example, exchanges also have very different clearance and settlement systems;
some markets are “quote driven,” while others are increasingly “order driven;”
some are non-profit membership organizations, while increasingly more have been
demutualized and are privately owned. See Poser, supra note 4, at 510-528.

6

Viewing exchanges as a kind of natural monopoly, these theorists argue that large
pools of liquidity in major markets will exercise a vacuum cleaner-like effect that
drains smaller markets in order to concentrate liquidity in a few major markets.
See Carmine DiNoia, Competition and Integration Among Stock Exchanges in
Europe: Network Effects, Implicit Mergers and Remote Access, 7 European
Financial Management 39, 42 (2001) (arguing that, as a matter of theory,
competition will result in “only one exchange surviving,” except when exchanges
negotiate alliances that convert them into a cooperative network).

7

See DeNoia, supra note 6, at 55.
3

underlies this competition among exchanges. This article will argue that this regulatory
competition will both (i) restrain the centralizing forces that others see as leading to a natural
monopoly of a few dominant “super-exchanges,” and (ii) improve corporate governance by
increasing the protection of minority shareholders.
Although the term “regulatory competition” has been much used in recent debates over
securities regulation, 8 the form of regulatory competition that has in fact developed over only the
last half dozen years is very different from that envisioned by its academic proponents. These
proponents, convinced that securities markets are often overregulated and skeptical of the motives
of public regulators, have advocated a system of “issuer choice” under which each issuer could
choose the regulatory regime under which its securities would trade.9 Thus, issuers incorporated

8

Theories about “regulatory competition” trace back to a classic 1956 article by
Charles Tiebout. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures,
64 J. Pol. Econ. 416 (1956). While Tiebout’s model essentially applied to the
provision of public goods, it was quickly and logically applied by others to the
private market and the regulation of business firms.

9

Typically, proponents of “issuer choice” view this approach as initiating a process
of regulatory arbitrage that would pare back excessive over-regulation. See
Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities
Regulation, 107 Yale L. J. 2359 (1998); Stephen Choi & Andrew Guzman, Portable
Reciprocity: Rethinking The International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 903 (1998). For Professor Romano’s latest statement of her views,
see Romano, The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation, Yale
ICF Working Paper No. 00-49 (June 2001) (available on SSRN website at
id=278728). Others have emphatically disagreed. See Merritt B. Fox, Retaining
Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not Investor
Empowerment, 85 Va. L. Rev. 1335 (1999). For Professor Fox’s latest statement
of his views, see Fox, The Issuer Choice Debate (forthcoming in 2 Theoretical
Inquiries in Law). A few economists have suggested that competition among
regulatory regimes will produce a “race to the top” toward higher, more restrictive
standards. For this view, see Steven Huddart, John Hughes and Markus
Brunnenmeier, Disclosure Requirements and Stock Exchange Listing Choice in an
International Context, 26 J. Acct. & Econ. 237 (1999). But still others have
disagreed, finding that competition among markets has already produced a “race to
4

in a U.S. jurisdiction and trading on the New York Stock Exchange could elect to be governed as
to their disclosure standards by the laws of India, Taiwan or Switzerland. By forcing different
regulatory regimes into competition, “issuer choice” in their view would enable firms to engage in
a regulatory arbitrage that would prune out-of-date or inefficient regulation, leaving only that
degree of regulation that sophisticated market participants would design for themselves.
In fact, however, the regulatory competition that has actually developed involves not
issuers choosing a regulatory regime from a menu of available options, but rather issuers migrating
to an international securities market on which it cross-lists - - and thereby opting into additional
and usually higher disclosure and corporate governance standards. Two critical differences
distinguish this system from the “issuer choice” model: First, issuers choose a market and a
regulatory regime together and cannot sever their choice of market from their choice of regulatory
principles. Thus, it is impossible to enter a strong and deep market, while observing only the
laws governing a thin or primitive market. 10 Second, the issuer cannot “exit” its home jurisdiction
in a manner that truly escapes its potentially more stringent regulation. 11
Initially, this article finds that strong legal standards today attract, rather than repel, issuers

the bottom” and lesser transparency. See Robert Bloomfield and Maureen O’Hara,
Can Transparent Markets Survive, 55 J. Fin. Econ. 425 (2000).
10

Increasingly, there is evidence that “strong” markets may have developed at least in
part because of strong legal institutions. See text and note infra at note 14.

11

Increasingly in the global economy, it may be possible to make such an exit from
the home country’s laws. See, e.g. Dan Burk, Virtual Exit in the Global Information
Economy, 73 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 945 (1998). But that is not what is happening in the
system of cross-listings that is currently emerging. Rather, the issuer would
continue to disclose to its home country regulator according to its home country’s
rules and in addition disclose to the exchange on which it cross-lists according to
that jurisdiction’s rules.
5

who are cross-listing. Indeed, when one examines the actual movement of issuers and listings
across jurisdictions, the dominant pattern has been a pronounced migration of listings and trading
to exchanges in jurisdictions that are noted for their strong protection of minority shareholders.12
Even in Europe, where firms today do possess a substantial degree of “issuer choice” - - namely,
the ability to choose the disclosure standards that apply to them - -, few firms seem to be opting for
the lower cost, less demanding options, but instead are voluntarily complying with the highest
level of disclosure.13 By opting for a higher disclosure regime, the migrating firms enhance their
share price and become able to raise additional equity at lower cost.
This finding that migrating firms are opting into stronger, more mandatory legal standards
is, of course, consistent with a new and important academic literature that argues that liquid and
deep securities markets develop only in jurisdictions that protect the rights and expectations of
minority shareholders.14 Still, even if the need to assure minority investors that they will be

12

See text and notes infra at notes 20 to 22 and 32 to 43.

13

See Howell Jackson and Eric Pan, Regulatory Competition in International
Securities Markets: Evidence from Europe in 1999- Part I, 56 Bus. Law. 653
(2001) (reporting results of survey showing that despite availability of issuer
choice, few firms employ it to reduce disclosure obligations).

14

The seminal work of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (“LLS&V”)
has established the existence of two rival structures of share ownership - dispersed ownership and concentrated ownership - - and that the structure of share
ownership in a given jurisdiction correlates with significant differences in the legal
protection provided to minority shareholders. See Rafael La Porta, et al.,
Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. Fin. 471 (1999); Rafael La Porta et.
al., Law and Finance, 106 J. Pol. Econ. 1113 (1998). This author has been
skeptical as to whether this “legal explanation” can truly account for the
appearance of the separation of ownership and control in Anglo-American
countries. See John Coffee, The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law
and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 Yale L. J. 1 (2001)
(arguing that the early development of a relatively autonomous and self-regulating
private sector in some countries better accounts for stock market development than
6

adequately protected underlies the contemporary race among foreign firms to cross-list on U.S.
exchanges, one cannot fairly leap from this conclusion to a broader scenario under which
intermarket competition produces an all-encompassing, regulatory “race to the top.”15 Not only is
the world more complicated and path dependent than such a simple Darwinian competitive model
suggests,16 but, more importantly, such a scenario misunderstands the normal impact of
competition. Put simply, competitive pressures tend to produce not uniformity, but specialization
and fragmentation.17
Particularly in the case of securities markets, any assumption that competition will produce
uniformity ignores that the universe of firms that use securities markets divides radically into those

do legal differences). Nonetheless, this author strongly agrees with the thesis that
“law matters” and that minority legal protections can affect share value. See John
Coffee, The Future As History: The Prospects for Global Corporate Convergence
in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 641 (1999).
15

The terms “race to the top” and “race to the bottom” have become familiar
shorthand expressions in a longstanding academic debate in the U.S. over whether
interjurisdictional competition among stakes for corporate charters produces more
or less efficient legal rules. Compare William Cary, Federalism and Corporate
Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 85 Yale L. J. 663 (1974) with Roberta Romano,
THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN LAW (1993). In a number of respects, the
competition among market centers for listings is different from the competition
among states to grant (and tax) corporate franchises.

16

Path dependency postulates that institutions evolve in a manner that is heavily
determined by initial starting points and pre-existing conditions. See Lucian
Bebchuk & Mark Roe, A Theory of Path Dependency in Corporate Ownership and
Governance, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 127 (1999). While this perspective has been applied
by several authors to corporate structure and evolution, it has not been previously
used as a means by which to model the competition among market centers.

17

For this generalization applied to securities markets, see Marshall Blume, “The
Structure of the U.S. Equity Markets” (Working Paper, January 8, 2002)
(“Fragmented markets are a natural result of competition”).
7

with concentrated ownership versus those with dispersed ownership.18 Concentrated ownership
firms tend to behave differently than dispersed ownership firms, with the former often acting to
maximize the private benefits of control for its controlling shareholders, while the latter tend to act
to maximize their share price in the market. As a result, to the extent that firms are the ultimate
consumers of exchange listings,19 these different types of firms are likely to have correspondingly
different attitudes toward migration to exchanges that impose stronger legal protections for
minority shareholders. Specifically, this article predicts that those firms that decline to migrate to
“high disclosure” exchanges will be disproportionately composed of firms with controlling
shareholders who would prefer to maximize their receipt of the private benefits of control, rather
than to maximize the share price of their publicly held, minority shares.
Phrased more generally, in a path dependent world, the regulatory posture of an exchange
is likely to be heavily influenced by the structure of shareholder ownership of the firms traded on
it. This conclusion implies in turn that different markets will serve different clienteles. Some may
become more transparent and impose higher listing standards in order to foster dispersed
ownership, attract portfolio investors and maximize the share value of listed companies, while
others may persist as lower cost, relatively opaque exchanges that accommodate firms with

18

See Rafael LaPorta, et. al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. Fin. 471
(1999).

19

It is, of course, debatable in many cases whether the listing choice is made in the
interests of public shareholders or controlling persons (either managers or a
dominant shareholder). If public shareholders determined where firms listed, a
regulatory race to the top would be predictable, because it would maximize share
value. Controlling shareholders are, however, less interested in maximizing the
value of the firm’s shares in the public market, because they can sell their control
block privately for a control premium and because they stand to receive private
benefits from control. Hence, they may resist greater disclosure or transparency if
it interferes with their receipt of private benefits.
8

concentrated ownership in which the private benefits of control will remain high. As a result, a
dual equilibrium becomes possible under which “high” and “low” disclosure exchanges persist,
side by side, reflecting the fact that firms with both concentrated and dispersed ownership will
also persist, side by side.
This prediction that competition should produce not conformity, but market fragmentation,
rests on the assumption that consumers in the market for exchange services have very different
preferences, thereby inducing this market to increase, rather than decrease, consumer choice, as
competitive pressures also increase. At first glance, this prediction may seem at variance with the
contemporary evidence, which shows that issuers have been delisting from “low disclosure”
exchanges and moving to “high disclosure” exchanges. In particular, European companies have
migrated heavily to U.S. exchanges over recent years, while U.S. companies have reduced their
cross-listings in Europe and Japan. 20 Overall, the competitive ability of European exchanges to
attract foreign listings has declined, while that of U.S. exchanges has soared.21 Yet, as will be
seen, the firms that have migrated to the U.S. market show special characteristics that do not apply
to those that have stayed behind.22

This picture becomes even more complex

20

See Marco Pagano, Ailsa Roell, and Josef Zechner, The Geography of Equity
Listings: Why Do European Companies List Abroad?, CSEF Working Paper No. 28
(October 1999) at p.7.; see also Jackson and Pan, supra note 8 (noting that few
issuers in Europe are opting to utilize lower disclosure standards even though
legally permitted to do so).

21

Pagano, Roell and Zechner, supra note 20, at 7. They add: “Interestingly, the
European markets with the highest trading costs, lowest accounting standards and
worst shareholder protections have also fared worst in attracting or retaining
foreign listings, and companies from those countries have been comparatively eager
in seeking foreign listings.” Id. In essence, this is a finding that many foreign firms
desire to bond.

22

See text and notes infra at notes 111 to 123.
9

once we recognize that the process of competition among markets does not end with the decision of
some firms to cross-list abroad. Rather, as national and regional markets lose liquidity and trading
volume to international exchanges, a political reaction has sometimes followed. In those
countries where the local brokerage and securities industry has been most adversely affected,
legislative and regulatory reforms have been adopted seeking to raise governance and disclosure
standards in order to stem the flight of firms and trading to foreign markets.23 Ironically, reforms
that the local brokerage industry might have once predictably resisted have instead been
championed by them in order to stem the exodus of trading to overseas markets. This political
response is also a form of regulatory competition, although not the sort envisioned by proponents
of “issuer choice.” As a result, the ability of controlling shareholders in at least some emerging
markets to retain the traditional private benefits of control may increasingly be challenged. In
short, there is a trade-off: firms with concentrated ownership may wish to persist in their
traditional system of corporate governance, but the viability of their market is threatened unless the
exodus of trading to international exchanges can be stemmed.
Organizationally, this paper is divided into five sections. Part I begins with an overview
of developments in the international securities markets, with a particular focus on the appearance
and development of the cross-listing phenomenon. Part II then turns to the obvious questions that
the rapid growth in international cross-listings poses: why do firms cross-list? What is the source
of the gains that cross-listing produces for these firms? Two competing explanations will be
assessed: (1) a market segmentation explanation, and (2) a corporate governance or “bonding”

23

See text and notes infra at notes 170 to 176.
10

hypothesis.24 Once, it was assumed that cross-listing was basically a means of integrating
segmented markets and thus enabling the issuer to access trapped pools of liquidity. A newer
interpretation is today emerging that cross-listing may also be a bonding mechanism by which
firms incorporated in a jurisdiction with weak protection of minority rights or poor enforcement
mechanisms can voluntarily subject themselves to higher disclosure standards and stricter
enforcement in order to attract investors who would otherwise be reluctant to invest (or who
would discount such stocks to reflect the risk of minority expropriation).25 Although both
explanations have some validity, the second or “bonding” explanation has the greater predictive
power for the future, because the barriers that once segmented markets have largely eroded (and
will continue to do so), thus reducing the need for issuers to enter distant markets to access trapped
pools of liquidity. Nonetheless, Part II will find that bonding is a complex phenomenon that needs
to be unpacked to be properly understood. Significant differences distinguish those firms that do
wish to bond from those that do not.
Parts III and IV focus on the changes impacting on securities markets globally and what

24

“Bonding” is a term of art in modern institutional law and economics. It refers to
the costs or liabilities that an agent or entrepreneur will incur to assure investors
that it will perform as promised, thereby enabling it to market its securities at a
higher price. The paradigmatic example would be the surety bond purchased by the
agent and protecting its shareholder principals. The term was coined in Jensen &
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976).

25

This author was probably the first to publish this hypothesis. See John Coffee, The
Future As History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate
Governance and Its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 641 (1999). Obviously, others
may have independently arrived at the same idea at more or less the same time.
See also Rene Stultz, Globalization, Corporate Finance, and the Cost of Capital, 12
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 8 (1999); Owen Fuerst, A Game Theoretic
Analysis of the Investor Protection Regulations Argument for Global Listing of
Stocks (Working paper 1998).
11

strategies individual exchanges can pursue to become more successful competitors. Part IV in
particular will predict increased specialization among exchanges and market centers, as they
attempt to serve very different clienteles. Although many exchanges, particularly those in
transitional economies, face formidable problems, notable efforts have recently been made in these
countries to compete by upgrading corporate governance standards - - to the point that some
markets now impose governance and disclosure standards exceeding those in force in the United
States. This development in turn poses an issue for U.S. regulators, as transactions can now be
potentially effected on U.S. markets that would be impermissible in the foreign issuer’s home
market as violative of those standards. Part V will examine the new form of regulatory
competition that appears to be developing and ultimately will recommend what it terms an “exitless” model for regulatory competition.
Part I. AN OVERVIEW OF MARKET COMPETITION
The history of head-to-head inter-market competition among stock exchanges is
conspicuous by its absence. That is, such competition was and remains rare.26 In the past, most
firms simply listed on their home country exchange, which was generally a public or a quasipublic entity that possessed a de facto monopoly. Historians can point to a few counterexamples,
but these seemed to prove little. For example, in the late 19th Century, the Consolidated Stock
Exchange challenged the NYSE by beginning to trade NYSE-listed stocks, charging lower
commissions because in part it simply used the NYSE’s quotes and did not have to invest in

26

A distinction needs to be drawn here between a competition for listings, which is
more common, and a competition for trading supremacy in the same security. Thus,
the NYSE, Nasdaq and the Amex have long competed for listings, but until recently
did not trade the same stocks. Nasdaq and some regional exchanges do now trade
NYSE-listed stocks but have only a small share of such trading. [cite NYSE Fact
Book].
12

establishing the NYSE’s price discovery mechanism. 27 For a while, this tactic worked, but the
challenger was gone by the end of the century. More recently, in the late 1980's, the London Stock
Exchange (“LSE”) unilaterally began to quote the major European-listed stocks and quickly gained
a dominant share over the European national exchanges.28 Essentially, much like the Consolidated
Stock Exchange a century earlier, the LSE was free-riding on a price discovery process that
actually occurred on the home-country exchanges, but by offering a faster execution and at low
cost, the LSE was able to divert a significant percentage of trades to its exchange.29 The
advantage, however, again proved short-lived. The European exchanges updated their trading
technology,30 and by 2000, the LSE had fallen behind and was forced to agree in principle to a
merger with the Frankfurt exchange.31
Although the LSE’s competitive challenge was successfully resisted, it set off a wave of
defensive mergers and alliance building that continues to the current date. At bottom, the goal in
this process of alliance building has been to erect a network that both (i) has superior liquidity to
its rivals, and (ii) is deliberately incompatible with its rival’s network, thereby excluding
members of the rival exchange or market. Even once networks are established, however, the

27

See DiNoia, supra note 6, at 43-44. See also text and note infra at note .

28

Id. at 44. The LSE did not require the firms it traded to formally request listing, but
rather proceeded without their request. Id at 54.

29

Id. at 54.

30

Essentially, the European exchanges moved from a call auction procedure to a
faster quote-driven trading technology. Id. at 54-55.

31

See Poser, supra note 4, at 502-03 (discussing the LSE’s recent problems). The
merger was thwarted by other developments, but the privately-owned LSE remains
a potential takeover target today.
13

phenomenon of cross-listing may still drain trading from one network to another, as next discussed.
A. Cross-listing: the dominant competitive technique
By far, the principal mechanism that produces competition among market centers has been
the issuer’s decision to cross-list its stock on a foreign exchange, typically in the United States.
Cross-listing on a United States exchange is usually effected by the issuer first establishing a
depository receipts facility (typically, with a major U.S. bank). The bank will hold shares of the
foreign issuer and issue depository receipts to U.S. investors, who will thereby achieve the
convenience of dollar-denominated trading. These depository receipts then may (or may not) be
listed on a U.S. exchange or Nasdaq.
During the 1990's, the popularity of American Depository Receipts (“ADRs”) soared. In
1990, 352 depository receipt programs from 24 countries were in effect in the United States,32 but
by 1999, this number had grown to 1,800 programs from 78 countries33 - - an increase of over 500
percent. The combined market capitalization of these companies exceeded $6 trillion at the end of
1999.34 Correspondingly, the number of foreign companies listed on the two principal U.S. stock
markets (the NYSE and Nasdaq) grew from 170 in 1990 to over 750 in 2000 (or roughly a 450%

32

See Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, and Daniela Klingebeil, Stock Markets in
Transition Economies, World Bank Financial Sector Discussion Paper No. 5 (Sept.
2000) at p. 17.

33

Id. A more recent study finds that, as of March, 2001, there were 1,951 “active”
depository receipt programs from 1,524 firms in 80 countries. See Stijn Claessens,
Daniela Klingebeil, and Sergio Schmukler, supra note 3, at p. 9.

34

Claessens, Djankov, and Klingebeil, supra note 32, at 17. In 1999, some $533
billion in ADRs were listed on the NYSE. See Claessens, Klingebeil and
Schmukler, supra note 3, at 2.
14

increase).35 As of April, 2001, over 970 non-U.S. firms were listed on the NYSE, Nasdaq or the
Amex.36 During the 1990's, trading of ADRs grew by 22 percent a year, reaching $758 billion in
1999.37 While depository receipts are primarily used simply to list a stock in a foreign market,
their listings can also be accompanied by equity offerings in the foreign market. In 1999 alone, a
record $22 billion was raised in the U.S. markets through the issuance of depository receipts,
which brought the total equity capital raised during the 1990's through this method to $133
billion. 38
The impact of cross-listings has been particularly pronounced on the NYSE. As Table 1
below shows, foreign listings on the NYSE have grown from approximately 2% of all NYSE
listings in 1975 and just over 5% in the early 1990's to over 15% in 2000.39 As Table 1 also
indicates, foreign listings have more than quadrupled since 1990, while domestic listings on the

35

See Gerald F. Davis and Christopher Marquis, Are U.S. Stock Markets A Pathway
to Global Governance Convergence? (Working Paper 2001).

36

See Michael Gruson, Global Shares of German Corporations and their Dual
Listings on the Frankfurt and New York Stock Exchanges, 22 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L.
185, 187 n.2 (2001).

37

See Davis and Marquis, supra note 35, at 3.

38

Id. In 2001, some $29 billion was raised in new equity through 115 depository
receipts offerings in the U.S. and European markets, a 32% increase over 1999.
See Claessens, Klingebeil and Schmukler, supra note 3, at 2.
All this is in sharp contrast to the European experience over the same
interval. U.S. cross-listings on European exchanges declined over the 1986 to
1997 interval, and firms cross-listing on European exchanges did not make
subsequent equity offerings at a higher rate than a control group. See Marco
Pagano, Alisa Roell, and Josef Zechner, The Geography of Equity Listing: Why Do
European Companies List Abroad? (CSEF Working Paper No. 28, October 1999).

39

This table is an abbreviated version of a table prepared by Professors Jonathan
Macey and Maureen O’Hara, “The Economics of Stock Exchange Listings Fees and
Listing Requirements” (Working Paper September 2001) at Table 1.
15

NYSE have actually declined since 1998.
Table 1
Foreign Listed Companies on the New York Stock Exchange
Year

Total Listing

Foreign

Domestic

Foreign listings as % of
total listings

1975

1557

33

1524

02.12%

1980

1570

37

1533

02.35%

1985

1541

54

1487

03.5%

1990

1174

96

1678

05.4%

1991

1885

105

1780

05.6%

1992

2089

120

1969

05.7%

1993

2361

153

2208

06.5%

1994

2570

216

2354

08.4%

1995

2675

247

2428

09.0%

1996

2907

304

2603

10.5%

1997

3047

356

2691

11.7%

1998

3114

379

2735

12.2%

1999

3025

406

2617

13.4%

2000

2862

434

2428

15.2%

The NYSE’s recent inability to attract a net increase in domestic listings, while its foreign listings
have soared over the same period, suggests that a NYSE listing does something for a foreign issuer
that it does not do for a domestic issuer. Within the U.S., the NYSE’s trading technology (which
still relies on an open outcry system on an actual trading floor and is significantly less
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computerized than its chief rival, Nasdaq) strikes many as relatively antiquated,40 and firms listed
on Nasdaq have shown less interest in recent years in moving up to the NYSE once eligible for
listing there. But for the foreign issuer, the NYSE still offers a critical advantage: its reputation as
the leading repository of high disclosure standards and market transparency. Here, it clearly
outranks its leading international competitor for listings, the LSE.41 The NYSE’s relative success
against the LSE suggests that reputation may be more important than technology - - at least for
firms that cross-list.
Why did the rate of foreign listings in the U.S. suddenly accelerate in the 1990's? To some
extent, the sudden growth in popularity of ADRs in the early 1990's was a consequences of state
privatizations of formerly state-owned enterprises, which swept across Europe and South
America, beginning in the late 1980's. Prior to this time, depository receipt programs were
typically used to facilitate over-the-counter trading and were not associated in most cases with
either a listing on the NYSE or Nasdaq or a contemporaneous equity offering in the United States.
Yet, these privatization offerings were often so large as to necessitate access to the world’s largest
capital market in the United States. Once these offering techniques were developed, they were
increasingly copied later in the 1990's by already private companies.
More generally, however, there was a world-wide explosive growth in stock market

40

For this assessment, see Cybo-Ottone, et. al., supra note 4, at 263. Although the
NYSE has a significantly greater market capitalization than the LSE ($12.4 trillion
versus $2.9 trillion), the LSE lists many more securities (over 12,000). See Poser,
supra note 4, at 500-02. Unlike the NYSE, the LSE has not sought to emphasize
higher listing or disclosure standards as a competitive strategy.

41

Cybo-Ottone, DiNoia and Murgia offer the assessment that “listing on the NYSE
seems to signal commitment to a shareholder value approach,” which the listing
foreign firm often advertises in the press. In contrast, listing on the London Stock
Exchange carries no such signal and is not advertised by firms listing thereon. Id.
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capitalization during the 1990's. Expressed in terms of the ratio of market capitalization to Gross
Domestic Product (“GDP”), a recent World Bank study finds that this ratio increased from a mean
(median) percentage of 31 (18) percent in 1990 to 62 (34) percent in 2000.42 While rich countries
outperformed poor countries,43 the direction was positive everywhere.
1. The Impact on Local Markets. As stock markets grew exponentially during the 1990's,
firms listed in the local market also listed abroad. Indeed, the ratio of market capitalization listed
abroad to total market capitalization rose even more dramatically than did the ratio of market
capitalization to GDP, particularly in emerging markets.44 Although a foreign listing does not
necessarily imply that trading will also shift to the foreign market, trading during the 1990's did in
fact follow the migration of listings, at least in the case of “middle-income” countries (which
category includes most emerging market economies in Asia and Latin America). For these
countries, the ratio of trading abroad to total trading rose over the decade of the 1990's “from a
few percentage points to some 40 percent in 2000.”45
On the positive side of the ledger, foreign listings enabled firms in emerging markets to
raise vast amounts of equity capital. In 2000 alone, some $29 billion in new equity was raised

42

See Stijn Claessens, Daniela Klingebeil, and Sergio L. Schmukler, supra note 3, at
p. 11. This growth reflected both prices for existing stocks and new listings.

43

The highest ratio of market capitalization to GDP was in Hong Kong where it was
383% in 2000, and the lowest ratio was in Bangladesh, where it was only 2.5%.
Id.

44

The World Bank study finds that this growth was the highest in “middle-income
countries” (such as much of East Asia and Latin America). In “middle-income”
countries, the ratio of market capitalization listed abroad to total capitalization
increased from single digit numbers in 1989 to a peak of 63 percent in 1999. Id at
12. This ratio declined to around 50% in 2000.

45

Id. at 13.
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through some 115 depository receipt offerings in the United States and European markets.46 For
“middle-income” countries, the majority of equity had been raised domestically up until the mid1990's, but, after that point, equity raised abroad began to vastly exceed the equity raised
domestically, with the foreign to domestic ratio peaking at 3.7 to 1 in 2000.47
On the other side of the ledger, the adverse impact on local markets from cross-listings
comes into clearest focus when we examine the special case of Latin American markets. In 1989,
only two Latin American companies were cross-listed, but by January, 1999, this number had
grown to 106.48 This increase seems best explained by the fact that companies found, over this
period, that cross-listing increased the value of their firm and enhanced the liquidity of their
stock. 49 Indeed, the market capitalization of the four principal Latin American stock exchanges
soared from $66 billion in 1990 to $439 billion in 1996 (or over 650%).
But, along the way, something else happened: stock turnover increased, and trading
migrated from Latin American countries to the United States. By 1999, over 87 percent, 54
percent, 62 percent and 71 percent of the Mexican, Argentine, Chilean and Brazilian stock market
indices, respectively, were available for trading in the United States in the form of ADRS.50 Even
more dramatically, trading moved to the United States, as the following table shows:

46

Id. at 2.

47

Id. at 13 and Figure 3 at 27.

48

See Kent Hargis, International Cross-listing and Stock Market Development in
Emerging Economies, 9 Int’l Review of Economics and Finance 101 (2000).

49

See Darius Miller, The Market Reaction to International Cross-Listings: Evidence
from Depository Receipts, 51 J. Fin. Econ. 103 (1999).

50

See Hargis, supra note 48, at 103.
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Table 2
Growth in U.S. Trading In Proportion to Domestic Trading (in millions).51
Argentina

1990

1993

1994

1995

1996

Domestic trading value:

852

10,339

11,372

4,594

4,382

U.S. trading value:

0

6,125

12,612

15,679

12,445

Turnover ratio (%)

26.1

37.4

65.0

53.6

37.7

5,598

57,409

109,498

79,186

112,108

U.S. trading value:

0

96

284

3,284

25,801

Turnover ratio (%)

34.2

57.8

58.0

55.9

63.2

Domestic trading value:

783

2,796

5,263

11,072

8,460

U.S. trading value:

92

2,369

7,210

11,600

9,584

Turnover ratio (%)

6.4

11.6

18.3

30.7

27.3

Domestic trading value:

12,212

62,454

82,964

34,377

43,040

U.S. trading value:

2,577

37,307

83,496

54,400

29,391

Turnover ratio (%)

45.2

49.7

127.8

97.9

67.9

Brazil
Domestic trading value:

Chile

Mexico

If one looks at the year 1995, one sees from this table that the value of Mexican, Argentine and
Chilean ADRS traded in the United States was greater than the total value of all stocks traded in
their respective domestic markets in that year. Only Brazil seemed exempt from this domination,
and, even in its case, 1996 was the first year in which U.S. trading became proportionately
significant (it has since increased substantially).

51

This table is taken from a fuller table in Hargis, supra note 48, at 102, table 1.
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In one respect, these tables understate the migration of trading to the U.S., because they
compare the trading in the security covered by the depository program to the trading of all
securities in the home country. Other studies that have focused just on trading in the securities
covered by depository programs have found that as much as 75% of the trading in those securities
shifts to the U.S.52
2. Who Cross-Lists? The evidence shows that firms establishing depository facilities in
the United States come heavily from emerging market economies; indeed, 73% of the non-U.S.
companies establishing such facilities in one recent study were from emerging markets.53 In 2001,
when ADR issuances fell sharply in the wake of terrorism and uncertainty, emerging market
issuers accounted for 73% of new ADR issuances, with Asian companies representing more than
half this total.54 A basic difference also seems to distinguish the motivation for cross-listings:
European countries often cross-list in the U.S. to gain a currency with which they can make stockfor-stock acquisitions of U.S. companies, whereas emerging market companies tend to be
interested simply in raising equity capital.55
In this light, the Latin American experience, which saw trading also migrate to the U.S. in
the wake the earlier migration of listings, may also generalize to other emerging market issuers, but
not to European issuers. On the other hand, Latin America may be unique in that trading on its
52

See Ian Domowitz, Jack Glen, and Ananth Madhavan, International Cross-Listing
and Order Flow Migration: Evidence from an Emerging Market, 53 J. Fin. 2001,
2002 (1998) (discussing Mexican market).

53

See Miller, supra note 49, at 104 (209 of 289 issuers establishing sponsored
depository receipt facilities in 1994 were from emerging market countries).

54

See Craig Karmin, “Foreign Concerns’ New Issuances of ADR’s Fell Sharply this
Year,” The Wall Street Journal, December 19, 2001 at p. C-13.

55

Id.
21

exchanges overlaps in time closely with the trading hours of U.S. markets.56 This is important
because the presence or absence of “flow back” (i.e., the return of trading to the home country)
probably predicts the degree to which a jurisdiction is pressured to reform its corporate
governance in the wake of issuers migrating to the U.S.57
B. IPOs in International Markets
Issuers can go one step beyond cross-listing on a foreign exchange; they can do their initial
public offering and listing on such an exchange and simply ignore their host country exchanges.
This would not seem a logical step for most young companies because they have greater visibility
in their home country, where price discovery can naturally occur more quickly and with less
transaction costs.
Still, there is one strong exception to this generalization: young Israeli companies have in
large number forsaken their home exchange (the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange) and done their initial
public offering on Nasdaq in the United States. Nasdaq currently lists 96 Israeli companies, “more
than from any other country outside of North America,” and the dollar value of equity trading in
Israeli stocks was estimated to be $44 billion in 1999.58 In 1999, ten Israeli companies raised

56

For example, the Mexican market is open from 9:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. EST in the
United States and thus fully overlaps with trading on the NYSE and Nasdaq. See
Domowitz, et al., supra note 52, at 2003.

57

Pulatkonak and Sofianos find that a market’s “time-zone distance from the U.S.”
best predicts the likelihood that trading will flow back to the U.S.; that is, markets
within, or near to, U.S. time zones will experience the largest trading volume loss
because of cross-listing. See M. Pulatkonak and G. Sofianos, “The Distribution of
Global Trading in NYSE-Listed Non-U.S. Stock,” NYSE Working Paper 99-03
(March, 1999).

58

See Edward Rock, Greenhorns, Yankees and Cosmopolitans: Venture Capital,
IPOs, Foreign Firms and U.S. Markets, (forthcoming in Theoretical Inquiries in
Law) (2001) at p. 7 (quoting Nasdaq’s website).
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more than $1 billion on Nasdaq, and since 1995, at least 88 percent of all equity capital raised by
Israeli firms was done through offerings on Nasdaq.59 Consequently, Israel has the highest ratio of
foreign to domestic market capitalization: 95.7% in 2000.60 In effect, it has largely piggybacked
on U.S. markets rather than developing its own.
Why do these Israeli companies ignore their home country exchange (or at least accord it
little active role)? Professor Edward Rock has examined these offerings and found a common
denominator:
“Without exception, the audience is a relatively
small group of U.S. institutional investors.”61
In effect, these offerings are marketed to a small group of U.S. institutional investors, ten of whom
might easily control a majority of the firm’s shares. In addition, the venture capitalists who
originally financed the infant firm (typically, a collection of U.S. and Israeli firms) had themselves
obtained much of their capital from U.S.-based venture capital investors, with the result that
beneficial ownership was in effect being transferred on the IPO from one cohesive group of
largely U.S. owners to another such group by means of Nasdaq. Moreover, some of these Israeli
issuers have actually incorporated in the United States (where they typically have significant
operations and market their products).
In this light, the Israeli example does not demonstrate that other young companies can adopt
the U.S. market and abandon their own. Rather, these Israeli companies were already highly

59

Id.

60

See Stijn Claessens, Daniela Klingebeil, and Sergio Schmukler, supra note 3, at p.
12.

61

See Rock, supra note 58, at 14.
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integrated into the U.S. corporate governance system. Thus, the Israeli experience instead
underscores that access to equity capital on the attractive, one-stop basis developed by Israeli
firms may require significant prior accommodation to U.S. governance norms and expectations.
C. Satellite Markets and Market Networks
A final mechanism for increased competition among market centers involves the unusual
act of bringing the mountain to Mohammed: namely, exporting the international market to other
areas of the world through satellite operations or a network of affiliations. This approach
involves significant start-up and operating costs, and thus might be beyond the financial capacity of
many exchanges, which generally have limited capital resources.
Nonetheless, one U.S. market - - Nasdaq - - has aggressively sought to expand on a global
basis, establishing major subsidiary markets in Europe and Japan. 62 Its announced goal has been to
create an integrated global marketplace that would offer round-the-clock trading, and its timetable
has been to link its Asian and European outposts with its U.S. trading operations by 2003.63
However, its success to date has been limited. For example, in Japan, its affiliate, Nasdaq Japan,
has acquired only 56 listings.64 What explains Nasdaq’s inability to achieve a broader acceptance
despite its strong brand name? The prevailing interpretation appears to be that, as an outsider, it
has inevitably encountered resistance from entrenched interests within the local region. 65 Also,
62

See “Vision Test: Nasdaq’s Drive to Build Global Exchange Hits Some Major
Potholes,” The Wall Street Journal, June 25, 2001 at p. A-1.

63

Id.

64

Id.

65

Id. The Wall Street Journal reporters emphasize Nasdaq’s affiliation with
Softbank, a firm that has been the subject of some controversy in Japan and is
perceived by some as excessively critical of the traditional Japanese style of
“clubby” networks. Yet, it seems inevitable that a new entrant will have to affiliate
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local issuers may prefer to list on the major local exchange, which at least for the present has
greater reputational capital for them.
In this light, the alternative and more logical means of extending the competitive range of
an exchange may be to buy, merge, or affiliate with the leading local exchange. This appears to be
the New York Stock Exchange’s strategy: namely, to negotiate affiliations with other exchanges
and seek cross-listings.66 Probably the leading example of growth through merger is Euronext, a
combination of the Paris, Amsterdam and Brussels exchanges, which the Lisbon exchange is also
scheduled to join in 2002.67 Almost concomitantly with the creation of Euronext, the Deutsche
Boerse and the London Stock Exchange negotiated a similar merger, only to see it ultimately
collapse over control issues. O.M. Gruppen Inc., the owner of the Swedish exchange, later made
an unsuccessful hostile bid for the London Stock Exchange,68 thereby foreshadowing the likelihood
that as exchanges are privatized, their control may become increasingly contestable in the market.
Market consolidation - - either through mergers or, more likely, through network alliances - seems the most likely scenario for the future, with relatively few exchanges seeking to cross
national borders and establish outposts in foreign jurisdictions. Over the near future, affiliations
among market centers may increase and begin to be negotiated with the same competitive intensity
as were diplomatic alliances in the 19th Century - - in both cases based primarily on the fear that
those who are left out will become the most vulnerable.

with relative outsiders.
66

Id. at A-6 (quoting NYSE Chairman Richard Grasso that “We are not going to plant
our flag in Tokyo”).

67

Id.

68

For a brief overview of these developments, see Poser, supra note 4.
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Part II. WHY DO FIRMS CROSS-LIST?: The Competing Explanations
To this point, it has been argued that cross-listing is the dynamic and de-stabilizing force
that will move liquidity from local exchanges to international “super-markets,” thereby impelling a
consolidation among market centers. But this explanation leads to an obvious further question:
what motivates firms to cross-list?
The answer may seem obvious: firms can increase their value through cross-listing. The
evidence here is relatively clear.69 But this answer only leads to a further question: why do stock
prices increase when firms cross-list? Here, there are two competing explanations, one old and
one new. The traditional explanation was that cross-listing broke down market segmentations and
allowed the firm to reach trapped pools of liquidity. 70 Segmentation of markets because of
investment barriers (e.g., taxes, regulatory restrictions, or informational constraints) creates an
incentive for firms to cross-list in order to achieve market integration. Economic theory has long
suggested that stock prices should rise for firms in segmented markets that cross-list. 71 A variation

69

See Craig Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi, and Rene Stulz, Why Are Foreign Firms
listed in the U.S. Worth More?, Working Paper (August, 2001) (finding sharply
higher valuations and Tobin’s q ratios for foreign firms listed in the U.S. even after
controlling for various differences); Miller, supra note 44; see also Stephen
Foerster and G. Andrew Karolyi, The Effects of Market Segmentation and Investor
Recognition on Asset Prices: Evidence from Foreign Stocks Listing in the United
States, 54 J. Fin. 981 (firms cross-listing in U.S. earn cumulative abnormal returns
of 19% in year before listing).

70

See N. Jayaranum, K. Shastri, and K. Tandon, The Impact of International Cross
Listings on Risk and Return: Evidence from American Depository Receipts, 17 J.
Of Banking and Finance 91 (1993); Foerster and Karolyi, supra note 69; Gordon
Alexander, Cheol Eun and S. Janakiramanan, Asset Pricing and Dual Listing on
Foreign Capital Markets: A Note, 42 J. Fin. 151 (1987).

71

See, e.g., Robert Merton, Presidential Address: A Simple Model of Capital Market
Equilibrium With Incomplete Information, 42 J. Fin. 483 (1987); Alexander, Eun
and Janakiramanan, supra note 70. These studies predict, or are at least consistent
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on this basic theory has suggested that, as cross-listing increases the shareholder base, the firm’s
risk is shared among more shareholders, which reduces the firm’s cost of capital.72 For a time, the
empirical evidence seemed to confirm this explanation because abnormal returns incurred by
cross-listing firms seemed to rise and then decline post-listing. 73 Until recently, little evidence
suggested that a dual listing actually increased firm value.74
But at least one recent study has found a different pattern: cross-listing results in positive
abnormal returns that are statistically significant and that do not dissipate post-listing. 75 Unlike
earlier studies, this study focused on the announcement date of the decision to cross-list, not the
actual listing date.76 The announcement date is clearly the theoretically more appropriate date
because the market should react to news of the expected improvement, and frequently there is an
appreciable delay between the announcement and the actual listing. In addition, this study by
Professor Darius Miller (the “Miller Study”) found that the abnormal returns were considerably
greater in magnitude when the firm cross-listed on the NYSE or Nasdaq than when the firm just
established a depository receipt facility in the United States and listed only on an over-the-counter

with a finding, that cross-listing between two segmented markets leads initially to a
higher equilibrium market price and a lower expected return thereafter.
72

See Foerster and Karolyi, supra note 69, at 988 to 995.

73

Id. at 993-995; Alexander, Eun and Janakiramanan, supra note 70 (also finding
post-listing decline).

74

See Miller, supra note 49, at 104.

75

Id. The Miller Study utilized a sample consisting of 181 issuers domiciled outside
the United States that announced their first depository receipts program over the
period from 1985 to 1995. Id. at 108.

76

Id. at 105.
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market.77 Although these findings are not necessarily inconsistent with the market segmentation
hypothesis, they better fit an alternative hypothesis that this article will call the “bonding
hypothesis.”
A. The Bonding Hypothesis
Essentially, the bonding hypothesis posits that cross-listing on a United States stock
exchange (including Nasdaq) commits the listing firm to respect minority investor rights and to
provide fuller disclosure. Listing on a U.S. exchange does so both because (i) the listing firm
becomes subject to the enforcement powers of the SEC; (ii) investors acquire the ability to
exercise effective and low-cost legal remedies (such as a class action and the derivative action)
that are not available in the firm’s home jurisdiction; and (iii) the entry into the U.S. markets
commits the firm (at least when it lists on an exchange or Nasdaq) to provide fuller financial
information and to reconcile its financial statements to U.S. GAAP accounting principles.78

77

Id. at 104 (finding that “abnormal returns are the largest for firms that list on major
U.S. exchanges such as NYSE or Nasdaq rather than OTC ‘pink sheets’ or
PORTAL.”)

78

Although there have been hints of forthcoming change, the Securities and Exchange
Commission continues to require that foreign issuers that file financial information
with it also file a reconciliation to U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(“U.S. GAAP”), as promulgated by the Financial Accounting Standards Board. See
SEC Concept Release, “International Accounting Standards,” Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 33-7801. For an overview, see Note, The SEC’s (Changing?)
Stance on IAS, 27 Brooklyn J. Int’l L. 315 (2001).
Any issuer, foreign or domestic, that lists on a U.S. exchange is required to
register with the SEC pursuant to Section 12(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and to enter the periodic disclosure system established by Section 13 of that
Act. In the case of foreign issuers, this obligation requires the filing of Form 20-F.
See 17 CFR 249.220f. Form 20-F must be filed annually within six months after
the end of the issuer’s fiscal year.
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Beyond these strictly legal requirements, entry into the U.S. equity markets exposes the
foreign issuer to the scrutiny of “reputational intermediaries,” including U.S. underwriters (if the
issuer undertakes an initial public offering in the U.S., as is frequently the case), auditors, debt
rating agencies, and securities analysts.79 Analysts can reasonably be viewed as financial
watchdogs who should be at least as skillful as public regulators in uncovering financial
chicanery, and hence a firm that subjects itself to their scrutiny is arguably “bonding” its promise
to make full and fair disclosure. Finally, the foreign issuer becomes subject to any listing
requirements imposed by the U.S. exchange on which it lists. Although U.S. exchanges do impose
significant corporate governance requirements on domestic firms that regulate board structure and
protect shareholder voting rights,80 they have largely waived these substantive corporate
governance requirements in the case of foreign issuers.81 Morever, the SEC has acquiesced in this
pattern. 82 As result, such increased minority protection as results from listing in the U.S. comes
79

When firms cross-list in the United States, they obtain significantly increased
coverage from securities analysts, and apparently more accurate forecasting of
future earnings. See Mark Lang, Karl Lins, Darius Miller, ADRs, Analysts and
Accuracy: Does Cross-Listing in the U.S. Improve a Firm’s Information
Environment and Increase Market Value? (Working Paper 2002).

80

See text and notes infra at notes 203 to 210.

81

An American Bar Association study, released in 2002, has concluded that “foreign
issuers can easily obtain an exemption from corporate governance listing
requirements.” See American Bar Association, Section in Business Law,
Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, SPECIAL STUDY ON MARKET
STRUCTURE, LISTING STANDARDS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
(May 17, 2002) at p. 26. As a practical matter, all that is required for a waiver
from the NYSE’s corporate governance requirements is an opinion from “an
independent counsel licensed in the issuer’s home country [that] opines that the
issuer’s governance practices are not prohibited in its domicile jurisdiction.” Id. at
27.

82

See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 24,634 (June 23, 1987) (“Order
Approving Proposed Rules Changes by the American Stock Exchange, Inc., and the
29

principally from SEC disclosure requirements and from public and private enforcement, but not
from the U.S. exchanges, themselves. Indeed, the broad exemption afforded by U.S. exchanges to
foreign issuers from the listing requirements that they apply to domestic companies represents a
new and important barrier to efforts by emerging markets to upgrade their corporate governance
standards.83
Because the only mandatory changes incident to entering the U.S. markets relate to
disclosure, the bonding hypothesis must postulate that improved disclosure can be a functional
substitute (albeit an imperfect one) for higher substantive standards of corporate governance. To
the extent that this premise is accepted, then listing in the United States resembles a bonding
mechanism, similar for example to the use of sureties or special monitors, which reduces the
potential for the expropriation of minority investors. This article will both defend this proposition
that enhanced disclosure can be a second-best substitute for governance reform and argue that entry
into the U.S. markets should require foreign issuers to meet the local governance standards
applicable to domestic companies.
As a matter of theory, the idea that a credible promise of improved disclosure should
produce a positive stock price reaction is neither surprising nor unorthodox. Economic theory has
long predicted that the more credibly that a firm commits itself to increased levels of disclosure,
the more that this action should reduce the informational asymmetry component of the firm’s cost of

New York Stock Exchange, Inc. to Amend the Exchanges’ Listing Standards for
Foreign Companies”). See also Roberta Karmel, The Future of Corporate
Governance Listing Requirements, 54 SMU L. Rev. 325, 333 (2001).
83

See text and note infra at notes 170 to 176. This barrier is new principally because
emerging markets have only sought to utilize listing requirements as a means of
addressing corporate governance over the last several years, generally after earlier
efforts to secure legislative reform failed.
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capital.84 Empirically, this view has been supported by a recent notable study that, as German
firms switched from German accounting principles to U.S. or International GAAP principles, their
bid-asked spread declined, and their trading volume increased.85 Although these converting firms
did not technically “bond” themselves to observe higher standards, they did make a credible
promise to provide superior disclosure, and the market reacted positively. Similarly, another
recent study finds that as foreign firms cross-list in the U.S., they obtain significantly increased
coverage by securities analysts and, as an apparent result, forecasts of their future earnings become
more accurate relative to forecasts of firms that do not cross-list. 86 Moreover, firm value
increases in direct response to increased analyst coverage.87 Finally, a study completed in 2002
finds that when foreign firms cross-list in the United States, the market’s reaction to the firm’s
subsequent earnings announcements increases significantly, suggesting that information is both
followed more closely and deemed more credible.88
84

Theoretical research has long argued that a commitment to increased disclosure
(and thus to reduced informational asymmetries) would produce a lower cost of
capital. See D.W. Diamond and R.E. Verrechia, Disclosure, Liquidity and the Cost
of Capital, 46 J. Fin. 1325 (1991); S. Baiman and R. E. Verrechia, The Relation
Among Capital Markets, Financial Disclosure, Production Efficiency and Insider
Trading, J. Acct. Res. 1 (1996).

85

See Christian Leuz and Robert Verrecchia, The Economic Consequences of
Increased Disclosure, 38 J. Accounting Res. 91, 121 (2000) (finding data to
support hypothesis that as German firms switched from German accounting to U.S.
or International GAAP standards, their stock price would rise).

86

See Mark Lang, Karl Lins, Darius Miller, ADRs, Analysts, and Accuracy: Does
Cross Listing in the U.S. Improve a Firm’s Information Environment and Increase
Market Value? (Working Paper 2002).

87

Id. at 22-24 (finding that the firms that experience the greatest improvement in
analyst coverage also experience the greatest valuation benefits from cross-listing).

88

See Warren B. Bailey, G. Andrew Karolyi, and Carolina Salva, The Economic
Consequences of Increased Disclosure: Evidence from International Cross31

B. The Case for Bonding.
Evidence supporting the bonding hypothesis tends to fall under four distinct headings, each
of which will briefly be examined.
1. The Market Reaction to Cross-listings. An initial source of evidence consists of studies
of the stock market’s reaction to a U.S. cross-listing by a foreign firm. Although there are
numerous such studies, most do not consider the possibility that a U.S. cross-listing serves to
protect and assure minority investors, and only one study has carefully focused on the market
reaction around the announcement date, rather than the often much later date of the actual listing.
The Miller Study found positive abnormal returns on the announcement of a prospective U.S.
listing, without any subsequent post-listing dissipation of those returns.89 Alone, this is significant
because proponents of the segmentation hypothesis have long interpreted their theory to predict that
post-listing expected returns would decline because investors would accept a reduced rate of
return with greater liquidity. 90 More importantly, the Miller Study also found that the stock price
performance of foreign firms that established a depository receipt facility depended heavily on
whether they also listed on an exchange or Nasdaq. Those that did not experienced only modest

Listings. (Dice Center Working Paper No. 2002-4 March 13, 2002) (available on
Social Science Research Network at id = 304560).
89

Miller, supra note 49, at 111. Miller finds the abnormal returns around the
announcement date to be “positive and significant,” amounting to 0.0115 (t=3.87).
In addition, he found that “the increase in share value around the announcement date
appears permanent,” with the post-announcement cumulative abnormal return
between day +2 and day +25 being 0.0071 (t=0.84). Id. Over the 125 day postlisting period that he observed, the average abnormal return was 0.0030 (t=0.16).
Id. at 112-12.
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See Foerster and Karolyi, supra note 69, at 982 (post-listing “expected returns
should fall as an additional built-in risk premium compensating for these barriers
dissipates”).
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positive abnormal returns,91 while, in sharp contrast, those that also listed on the NYSE or Nasdaq
experienced much larger positive abnormal returns, which were in fact more than double those of
the firms that did not list. 92 Finally, foreign firms that only did private placements under Rule
144A in the U.S. market and then listed on PORTAL, a special electronic market restricted to large
institutional investors, had the smallest abnormal returns.93
Why are these differences significant? Here, it is necessary to understand that a foreign
firm wishing to access the U.S. capital markets by establishing a depository receipt facility has a
choice of essentially four options. First, it can establish only a “Level I facility,” which means that
while a U.S. bank, or other agent, will hold its shares and issue receipts reflecting interests in them
to investors, trading in these receipts will be conducted only on the over-the-counter market
(typically, in the so-called “pink sheet” market). Secondly, the foreign firm can again establish a
depository receipt facility, but now the firm lists its ADR securities on an exchange or Nasdaq
(this is called a “Level II” facility). Third, the foreign firm can establish the same depository
facility, list its securities, and in addition conduct an underwritten public offering in the U.S.
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Miller, supra note 49, at 115 (Table 4). The average abnormal returns around the
announcement date for foreign firms that listed on the over-the-counter or “pink
sheet” market (i.e., a Level I facility) was 0.0127 (t=2.83), which was positive and
significant, but less than one half the average abnormal returns of firms listing on
the NYSE or Nasdaq. See note 92 infra.
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The average abnormal returns around the announcement data for foreign firms
listing on the NYSE and Nasdaq was 0.0263 (t=6.64). Id. at 114-115. This was
twice the level of abnormal returns for firms listing only in the over-the-counter
market. See note 91 supra.
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The average abnormal returns around the announcement date for foreign firms
listing on PORTAL was actually negative (-0.0109) (t=-1.47), but was statistically
insignificant. Id. at 114-115. The difference between a NYSE/Nasdaq listing and
a PORTAL listing was 3.72% (t-statistic of difference = 6.49). Id. at 115.
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markets - - in effect, entering the primary market as well as the secondary market (this is known as
a “Level III” facility). Finally, one last alternative is to conduct a Rule 144A private offering
(which does not entail SEC registration or sales to public retail investors) and then list these
securities on PORTAL, which is a private electronic market on which only very large institutional
investors can trade (who are known as “Qualified Institutional Buyers” or “QIBs”).94 This last
technique is sometimes referred to as a “RADRs” (that is, a Rule 144A offering of ADDS), and it
does not involve any entry into the public markets (either the primary or secondary markets) in the
U.S.
Legally, there are important differences between these various levels. Basically, firms that
establish only a depository facility without listing on an exchange or Nasdaq (a “Level I” facility
in the standard parlance of securities lawyers) are not required to become “reporting companies”
under the U.S.’s federal securities laws, need not reconcile their financial statements in
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Rule 144A (“Private Resales of Securities to Institutions”), 17 C.F.R. 230.144A,
exempts resales made by the initial purchasers of securities to “Qualified
Institutional Buyers,” who generally must manage a portfolio in excess of $100
million in order to so qualify, from the registration requirements of the Securities
Act of 1933. PORTAL is a electronic secondary market operated by the National
Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”) in which only QIBs may trade.
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accordance with U.S. GAAP,95 and need not file Form 20-F with the SEC.96 Rather, an exemptive
SEC rule (Rule 12g3-2(b)) permits unlisted foreign private issuers to simply continue to file the
same documents that they file with their home country regulator and/or stock exchange with the
SEC.97 In short, from a corporate governance perspective, little of significance happens when only
a Level I facility is created; there is no upgrading in the quality of financial disclosure and no
bonding of any consequence. In contrast, when a foreign firm lists on a U.S. stock exchange or
with Nasdaq, it must become a reporting company, must annually file Form 20-F with the SEC, and
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Disagreement persists as to whether U.S. GAAP accounting principles provide
more or better disclosure than International GAAP (or “IAS”). See Christian Leuz,
IAS versus U.S. GAAP: A (New) Market Based Comparison (Working Paper
2001) (arguing that they are functionally equivalent) (available on SSRN electronic
library at id=275340). This issue of the differences between IAS and U.S. GAAP
dominates the current agenda of the International Accounting Standards Committee.
Yet, even if IAS and U.S. GAAP are of similar quality, many emerging market
issuers use accounting principles that do not comply with IAS, and thus in these
cases a U.S. listing necessarily implies a substantial upgrade in the quality of the
financial disclosures provided.
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Form 20-F is the SEC form for foreign issuers corresponding to Form 10-K, which
domestic issuers must file once they become subject to Section 13 or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Unlike domestic issuers, foreign private issuers
need only file Form 20-F within six months after the end of their fiscal year.
Basically, Form 20-F requires the same financial information as Form 10-K, but
permits the foreign issuer to file this information in accordance with non-U.S.
GAAP principles, if a reconciliation to U.S. GAAP is included. See Item 17 to
Form 20-F.
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See 17 C.F.R. 240. 12g3-2(b). This rule exempts foreign issuers who otherwise
would be required to register and become a “reporting company” under Section
12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 if the foreign issuer (i) is not listed on
an exchange or Nasdaq, and (ii) agrees to file with the SEC the same documents
and information it files with its home country regulators or home stock exchange or
that it otherwise distributes, or is required to distribute, to its security holders.
Hence, firms listing on Nasdaq must become “reporting companies,” and in the
case of foreign issuers this requires them to file Form 20-F.
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must reconcile its financial statements to U.S. GAAP.98 In addition, it becomes subject to SEC
oversight and to private enforcement in the U.S. courts through class and derivative actions. In
short, there are meaningful corporate governance changes, and thus the Miller Study’s findings
support the interpretation that the market has responded to these changes by increasing the firm’s
share price.
Finally, when a foreign firm both establishes a depository facility in the U.S., lists on a
stock exchange, and makes a public offering of securities in the U.S. (i.e., a Level III facility), the
Miller Study found a much stronger positive market reaction than when the firm simply listed on an
exchange or Nasdaq (i.e., a Level II facility).99 Intriguingly, this is in sharp contrast to the normal
U.S. experience in which public firms announcing a public offering of equity typically experience
an abnormal negative stock price movement. 100 Further complicating the picture is another finding
in the Miller Study: when foreign firms sell equity in the U.S. markets in a private transaction
under Rule 144A, there is a negative price reaction, while in contrast U.S. firms increase
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Rule 12g3-2(b) does not apply to firms listed on Nasdaq after October 5, 1983.
See Rule 12g3-2(d)(3).
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See Miller, supra note 49, at 117. Foreign firms raising capital in a public equity
offering (i.e. a Level III facility) “experienced a positive and significant stock price
reaction of 0.0323 (t=5.67).” Id.
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For example, one study finds that public equity offerings by U.S. firms decrease
shareholder wealth by an average of 3%. See R.W. Masulis and A. Korwar,
Seasoned Equity Offerings: An Empirical Investigation, 15 J. Fin. Econ. 3 (1986).
The standard interpretation for this pattern is that when a seasoned firm announces
an intent to make a public offering, the market takes this announcement as a signal
that the firm does not consider its stock to be underpriced (and may consider it to
be fully priced or more). In effect, the market realizes that the firm possesses
asymmetric information about its future prospects and sees this announcement as
implicitly revealing that these future prospects will not improve in the short-term.
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shareholder wealth on average by making private placements.101 The apparent paradox then is that
while a public sale by a foreign issuer in the U.S. market increases firm value, a private sale does
not, whereas the reverse is true in both cases for domestic issuers.
Curious as this pattern may seem, it makes sense from a corporate governance perspective.
By making a public registered sale in the U.S., a foreign issuer voluntarily subjects itself to the
strict liability provisions of Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933. In principle, this gives
added credibility to what it says (because it faces high liability for any material misrepresentation
or omission). In contrast, a foreign issuer that merely lists on the NYSE or Nasdaq faces antifraud
liability only under Rule 10b-5, which places on the plaintiff the burden of proving the defendant’s
fraudulent intent (or “scienter”). The difference between strict liability versus liability only for
statements made with fraudulent intent is ultimately a difference in the degree to which the firm has
“bonded” itself to tell the truth. Also, a public offering in the U.S. involves the preparation of a
detailed registration statement which will provide more current information than the typical Form
20-F.102 Arguably, the positive market reaction to a public offering by a foreign firm reflects both
the value of more information and enhanced credibility.
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See Miller, supra note 49, at 117 (finding small negative price reaction to a Rule
144A private placement by a foreign firm). In contrast, an earlier study of U.S.
firms making private placements finds that they result in an average increase in
shareholder wealth of 4%. See Karen Wruck, Equity Ownership Concentration and
Firm Value: Evidence from Private Equity Financing, 23 J. Fin. Econ. 3 (1989).
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A foreign issuer making its first offering in the U.S. will typically use Form F-1,
which will require it to provide current information as of a date close to the
effective date of the registration statement. In contrast, a Form 20-F provides less
historical information and can become relatively stale because it need not be filed
until six months after the close of the issuer’s fiscal year. For example, as of May,
2002, a foreign issuer’s last public filing on Form 20-F need only cover the year
ending December 31, 2000, while a domestic U.S. issuer would have had by this
point to have filed its Form 10-K covering its 2001 fiscal year.
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Ultimately, the marked improvement in the stock price reaction to foreign firms that
conduct a public offerings in the U.S. versus foreign firms that simply list on the NYSE or Nasdaq
corroborates the bonding hypothesis much more than it supports the market segmentation
explanation. Once a foreign firm has listed on the NYSE or Nasdaq, market segmentation has been
largely broken down, and the international capital markets have been integrated as to that security.
Thus, if the market responds positively to the additional fact that the firm announces a public
offering, this additional share price increase seems logically best attributed to an explanation other
than the market segmentation explanation. Possibly, the public offering can be seen as a signaling
device (much as stock splits are viewed as positive signals).103 Still, no inherent reason suggests
why the announcement of a public offering in the U.S. would be seen as a positive signal of still
undisclosed information, particularly when the firm has every incentive to disclose such
information or delay the offering until it can be disclosed, in order in either case to assure that the
positive information has been fully incorporated into its share price. On balance, the simpler
explanation is that the market realizes that it can rely with greater confidence on the issuer’s
statements in a U.S. prospectus, because (a) the issuer faces strict liability for material
misstatements or omissions;104 (b) a powerful engine of private enforcement (i.e., the contingent
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This suggestion has been made to me by my colleague, Professor Jeffery Gordon.
Although I am doubtful that the announcement of a public offering signals the
existence of undisclosed, positive information, it is much more possible that such
an offering by a foreign issuer signals the issuer’s intent to abide by a different set
of corporate governance policies than it has previously observed (including a
policy of full disclosure).

104

Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 imposes strict liability on the issuer for
material misstatements or omissions in a registration statement without regard to
proof of fraudulent intent or reliance by the plaintiff, and it also accords the issuer
no affirmative defense of due diligence.
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fee-motivated plaintiff’s bar) stands ready to enforce the U.S.’s legal rules; and (c) more reliable
gatekeepers (i.e., U.S. underwriters and auditors) have conducted a “due diligence” investigation
into the offering, motivated in part by their own high liability for negligent errors or omissions.
An additional source of possible evidence of bonding may lie in the differing market
reaction to the announcement of a foreign firm’s decision to list on a U.S. exchange depending on
the particular firm’s geographic location. The Miller Study finds that, over a three-day
announcement window, foreign firms in emerging markets experienced nearly double the
cumulative abnormal returns of firms from developed markets.105 However, this study also found
that this difference was not statistically significant. 106 Still, after further refinement of its data, the
Miller Study ultimately concluded that, on announcement of a U.S. exchange listing, firms within a
subcategory that it defined as the “Free Emerging” market experienced a statistically significant
share price gain that was nearly double that experienced over this same period by developed
market firms.107 Although Miller attributed this difference to the breakdown of market
segmentation, it is likely that the firms within this sub-category would have been rated as having
weak corporate governance by more recent researchers.
Another study has also found a positive and permanent market reaction for Asian firms that
list in the United States.108 While the magnitude of this positive movement was modest, it did not
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Miller, supra note 49, at 115 (Emerging market issuers had a three day
announcement period abnormal return of 0.0154 (t=2.39), while developed market
firms had a similar period return of 0.0087 (t=2.84)).
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Id.
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Id. at 117.
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See Foerster and Karolyi, supra note 69, at 994 (Table IV). Although Asian firms
underperform other firms both in their stock market performance during the year
prior to listing and during the window period surrounding the listing (but in a
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fade away post-listing. This was in contrast to the finding in these same studies that most nonAsian foreign firms earn high positive abnormal returns in the year prior to listing, but then
experience high negative abnormal returns in the year after listing.
What could explain the persistence of these gains in the case of Asian firms? Recent
empirical research on corporate governance has identified several Asian countries as having
corporate governance systems that particularly expose minority shareholders to expropriation by
controlling shareholders.109 Although these findings do not apply to all Asian countries, they could
explain, at least in part, why a sample of Asian firms cross-listing on U.S. exchanges would show
a more permanent stock market reaction: namely, because such a market reaction is more
consistent with the bonding hypothesis than with market segmentation explanation.
All these studies are, however, dated in at least one critical respect because they examine
periods prior to the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998. Corporate governance theorists have
plausibly proposed that the expropriation of minority shareholders is not a constant, steady
phenomenon, but rather an episodic one that occurs primarily in periods of declining expectations,

statistically insignificant fashion) in this study, they were almost unique in their
positive post-listing performance. On average, other firms declined during the year
following U.S. listing (and to a statistically significant degree), but Asian firms and
European firms (other than those in the United Kingdom) had a modest positive
market reaction. The implication is apparently that Asian firms do behave
differently.
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See Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, Joseph Fan and Larry Lang, On
Expropriation of Minority Shareholder: Evidence from East Asia (World Bank
Working Paper February 2000) (available on SSRN Electronic Library at
id=202390); Michael Lemmon and Karl Lins, Ownership Structures, Corporate
Governance, and Firm Value: Evidence From the East Asian Financial Crisis,
(Working Paper April 2001) (available on the SSRN Electronic Network at
id=265108).
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particularly following major stock market retreats.110 The Asian financial crisis may thus have
produced an increased rate of expropriation, and in response portfolio investors may have become
more skeptical of such firms. Accordingly, Asian firms wishing to access international equity
markets thereafter would have increased incentive to bond in order to overcome this skepticism.
2. The Cross-Listing Premium. A second source of data involves a comparison of the
foreign firms that do cross-list in the U.S. versus those that do not. A 2001 study by Doidge,
Karolyi and Stulz focused not on stock price reaction but on the valuations of foreign firms that
cross-list in the United States in comparison to a control group that did not so cross-list. 111 Using
the Worldscope database of firms, they find that “the firms listed in the U.S. have a Tobin’s q ratio
that exceeds the q ratio of firms from the same country that do not list in the U.S. by 16.5% on
average.”112 This valuation difference, which they call the “cross-listing premium,” depends
significantly on the particular form of listing chosen and is largest for exchange-listed firms,
where it reaches 37%.113 In the abstract, such a valuation disparity could reflect either
segmentation or bonding. Because an exchange listing increases the firm’s liquidity, it is fully
consistent with the market segmentation hypothesis, but at the same time the bonding hypothesis is
also supported because an exchange listing requires the issuer to reconcile its financial statements
to U.S. GAAP.
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See Simon Johnson, Alasdiar Breach and Eric Friedman, Corporate Governance in
the Asian Financial Crisis, 1997-1998 (Working Paper, March 1999) (available on
SSRN Electronic Library at id=155008).
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See Craig Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi, and Rene Stulz, Why Are Foreign Firms
Listed in the U.S. Worth More? (Working paper August 2001).

112

Id. at 1.
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Id.
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Yet, if this data does not seemingly favor one explanation over the other, two additional
factors suggest at least the special relevance of the bonding hypothesis:
First, firms “from countries with poorer accounting standards” were found “more likely to
list in the U.S.”114 This makes sense from a bonding perspectives, because a U.S. listing would
uniquely signal for such companies that their accounting had been upgraded.
Second, those firms that not only cross-listed on an exchange but also raised equity capital
in connection therewith (i.e., a level III facility) had a “significantly higher premium.”115 Again,
because an exchange-listed firm already has high liquidity, this added premium for capital raising
efforts suggests that the fact of SEC registration and the use of a U.S. underwriter is interpreted by
the market as further and persuasive evidence that the issuer has credibly committed itself to a full
disclosure policy.
3. Post-Listing Behavior: Common Law Firms Versus Civil Law Firms. Although the
foregoing stock price studies did not consciously seek to test the bonding hypothesis (and indeed
may have been unaware of it), one study has made a deliberate effort to test this explanation by
comparing firms incorporated in common law jurisdictions to civil law jurisdictions. The premise
to this comparison is the well-known assertion made by LLS&V (and, more recently, by others)
that the civil law provides inferior protection for minority shareholders. If this is true, then it
would also logically follow that firms incorporated in civil law jurisdictions would gain more
from cross-listing in the United States.
To test this hypothesis, William Reese, Jr. and Michael Weisbach examined the
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Id. at 21.
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Id. at 24.
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composition and post-listing behavior of foreign firms that cross-listed in the United States and
concluded that the evidence tends to corroborate the bonding hypothesis. Among their principal
findings were the following:
1. Firms incorporated in countries with legal systems deriving from
French civil law, which according to LLS&V provides the weakest
shareholder protections, were the most likely to cross-list in the
United States;116
2. Such French civil law firms are also the most likely to cross-list
on securities exchanges, such as the NYSE and Nasdaq, while firms
incorporated in English common law jurisdictions are more likely to
establish only Level I facilities and remain on the over-the-counter
market;
3. Firms that cross-list in the United States significantly increase
their equity offerings following a U.S. listing. 117 This would appear
consistent with the hypothesis that a U.S. listing in some way
protects minority shareholders;
4. The post-listing increase in equity offerings occurs both inside
and outside the United States. The substantial increase in postlisting equity offerings outside the United States that they find cannot
be explained in terms of a market segmentation hypothesis, but is
consistent with a bonding explanation;118 and
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William Reese, Jr. and Michael Weisbach, Protection of Minority Shareholder
Interests, Cross-listings in the United States, and Subsequent Equity Offerings,
(NBER Working Paper No. 8164 March 2001) (available on the SSRN Electronic
Library at id=263426).
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In their sample, 167 equity offerings were effected in the two year period
subsequent to a U.S. listing, which was 46% higher than the 114 offerings that these
same firms engaged in the two year period prior to cross-listing in the United
States. Id. at 2.
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Reese and Weisbach find that the average firm in their sample increased “its equity
offerings outside the United States by a factor of more than three from .083 to .275
per firm from the two years prior to the listing to the two years subsequent to (and
including the time of) the offering.” Id. at 3.
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5. The weaker the shareholder protections in the foreign firm’s
home jurisdiction, the greater the quantity of equity offered by the
firm after the time of its U.S. listing. 119 Finally, equity issuances
following cross-listings tend to be inside the U.S. for “common
law” firms with strong legal protections, but outside the U.S. for
French civil law firms. This suggests that “common law” firms
come to the U.S. to tap its capital markets, while “civil law” firms
come more for bonding purposes.
The reverse side of this coin has been investigated by Pagano, Roell and Zechner.120 They
find that the number of U.S. companies cross-listing in Europe shrank over the 1986 to 1997
interval (despite continued expansion by U.S. firms in Europe). Moreover, European firms crosslisting in the U.S. behaved very differently from European firms cross-listing on other European
exchanges. European firms cross-listing in the U.S. pursued a strategy of rapid expansion fueled
by high leverage before the listing and made large equity offerings after the listing. 121 They also
tended to be in high-tech industries. In contrast, European firms cross-listing in Europe did not
grow at a more rapid rate than a control group and did not tend to make equity offerings after the
offering, but rather increased their leverage after the cross-listing. 122 They conclude that “the
motivation for a U.S. listing appears to be the need for an equity infusion by rapidly expanding,
highly leveraged companies that plan to expand their sales internationally and/or belong to hightech industries.”123 Although this finding is consistent with the bonding hypothesis, it suggests that
those firms that enter for the U.S. market from a particular country differ distinctively from those
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See Pagano, Roell, and Zechner, supra note 20.
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Id. at 29.
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firms in that same country that do not enter the U.S., quite apart from the fact that those that do enter
the U.S. may provide greater legal protection or more credible disclosure to their shareholders.
As next discussed, this ex ante difference between listing and non-listing firms requires some
reinterpretation of the bonding thesis.
4.

Flow back and Market Share. That a foreign firm lists on the NYSE or Nasdaq

does not imply that its common stock will principally trade there (as opposed to on its home
country exchange). In general, the NYSE fraction of total global trading volume for foreign firms
listed on the NYSE ranges from as low as 1 percent to more than 90 percent. 124 In most cases, the
allocation of trading between the NYSE and the home country exchange is constrained by an
inherent limitation in the nature of the securities traded: the NYSE will trade the issuer’s ADRs,
while the home country exchange will trade the issuer’s ordinary shares. This was not the case,
however, when DaimlerBenz AG merged in a share-for-share exchange with Chrysler Corporation
in 1998. Rather, DaimlerBenz carefully designed a new security - - a Global Registered Share - that could trade and settle on both the NYSE and the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (and other
exchanges).125 Freed from the usual constraints that restrict flow back, 95 percent of the trading in
the DaimlerChrysler promptly flowed back to Frankfurt. 126 Yet, DaimlerBenz had elaborately
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See Andrew Karolyi, DaimlerChrysler AG, The First Truly Global Share (Working
Paper May 2001) (available on Social Science Research Network at id=185133) at
15 (citing M. Pulatkonak and G. Sofianos, The Distribution of Global Trading in
NYSE-listed Non-U.S. Stocks (NYSE Working Paper 99-03).
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See Karolyi, supra note 124.
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Id. One additional factor should be noted: right after the merger, Standard & Poor
announced that DaimlerChrysler (the merged company) would be dropped from the
S&P 500 index. Although this led indexed investors to sell DaimlerChrysler, it
gave no relative advantage to the Frankfurt market and indeed arguably only created
a level playing field.
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negotiated its listing on the NYSE only a few years earlier and had undergone the painful
experience of converting its earnings from German to U.S. GAAP, which transition had turned a
reported profit (under German principles) into a loss (under U.S. GAAP).127 In short, Daimler
management saw a U.S. listing as important to it, but its shareholders still preferred to trade in
Germany. Such evidence suggests that, although the U.S. listing was useful to Daimler, its value
lay not in breaking down market segmentation or in improving liquidity, but in serving as a
mechanism for bonding. Without a NYSE listing, Daimler could not have made a major U.S.
acquisition for stock, because U.S. shareholders would not be satisfied with holding a foreign,
risky and illiquid security in lieu of their former Chrysler shares. Still, the need to assure U.S.
shareholders that they were protected against expropriation did not require that trading actually
occur in the U.S., and it quickly migrated back to Germany.
This phenomenon of “flow back” thus supports the bonding hypothesis, because it shows
that the value of a U.S. listing may have little to do with improving liquidity. However, it also
suggests that a U.S. exchange may have little incentive to cause foreign issuers to bond in this
fashion, because the U.S. exchange does not necessarily capture the trading in that stock.
C.

The Case Against Bonding

The simple bonding story also has its critics, who raise variations on the following themes:
1. Litigation Risk. One skeptical response has been that increased enforcement risk
associated with a U.S. listing has been exaggerated. A detailed study by one critic argues that SEC
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When Daimler-Benz agreed to reconcile its accounting to U.S. style GAAP for
purposes of listing on the NYSE, its 1993 net income fell from Deutsche Marks
(DM) 615 million under German GAAP to a loss of DM 1,839 million under U.S.
GAAP. See Dennis Logue and James Seward, Challenges to Corporate
Governance: Anatomy of a Governance Transformation: The Case of DaimlerBenz, 62 Law & Contemp. Problem 87, 92 (summer 1999).
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actions against foreign firms listed in the U.S. have been rare.128 For example, between January,
1995 and June, 2001, the SEC apparently took legal action against just five foreign firms with
listed ADRs.129 Private enforcement of the securities laws against foreign firms also appears to
have been limited. The same study finds only a total of twenty-five private actions against foreign
firms between the enactment of the earliest federal securities laws in 1933 and July 31, 2001.130
This evidence is, however, far from dispositive, either on the empirical or theoretical
level. First, the SEC has recently brought high-profile enforcement actions against foreign firms
listed on U.S. exchanges,131 and private class actions involving foreign companies listed in the
United States have similarly been filed and settled at significant cost to the foreign defendants.132
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See Jordan Siegel, Can Foreign Firms Bond Themselves Effectively By
Submitting to U.S. Law? (MIT Working Paper September 10, 2001).
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Id. at 25. The SEC did, however, initiate some 54 legal actions against foreign
firms over this same period, but only six of these were listed firms.

130

Id. This computation was based on a search of LEXIS records.
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An important and much noticed recent SEC enforcement action was In the Matter of
E.ON. AG, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 43372, 2000 SEC LEXIS 2055
(Sept. 28, 2000). There, the SEC sued a German corporation, Veba AG, for
misleading statements (made in Germany) in which it falsely denied the existence
of merger negotiations with another German corporation, which negotiations
eventually resulted in the creation of the third largest German industrial holding
company. The defendants quickly agreed to a settlement with the SEC.
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Two recent examples show the same fact pattern involved in the proceeding
footnote being litigated by private plaintiffs in class actions: (1) Buxbaum v.
Deutsche Bank AG, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1893 (S.D.N.Y. February 7, 2002)
(denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment in a class action alleging that
Deutsche Bank made misleading statements to the market in connection with its
merger with Bankers Trust); and (2) In re Alcatel Alsthom Securities Litig., MDL
1263 (E.D. Tex. 2001) (approving $75 million settlement paid by Alcatel to former
shareholders of DSC Communications Corp., which Alcatel acquired in a stockfor-stock merger based on allegedly inflated financial statements). Although the
Alcatel settlement is not reported on LEXIS or Westlaw, a $75 million settlement
is substantial and will come to the attention of the extremely entrepreneurial
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Second, as with other administrative agencies, the SEC’s litigated actions resemble the tip of the
proverbial iceberg. More enforcement occurs through informal contacts, warnings, and
administrative enforcement than through litigated actions. If the SEC is skeptical of a company or
its disclosures, it can exercise very practical, but low-visibility sanctions, such as simply failing
to clear or declare effective a registration statement. Such warnings are likely to be particularly
respected by a foreign issuer, who is typically used to deferring to governmental instructions.
On the level of theory, it is a fundamental mistake to believe that the deterrent threat of a
legal standard can be reliably inferred from evidence about the actual rate of apprehension or the
actual severity of sanctions. Deterrence theorists have long recognized that the population to be
deterred has only limited and generally inaccurate knowledge of the “true probabilities” of a
detection. 133 More important is the manner in which the legal threat is communicated. Here, the
corporate bar in the United States is the government’s natural ally, because it maximizes its own
importance by focusing its client on the possibility of SEC enforcement (and thus on the need to
consult closely with U.S. counsel). Moreover, the basic message communicated by U.S. counsel
that there are legal risks associated with entering the U.S. is one that much of the world already
understands, because the United States is widely perceived by foreign firms and their officers as a
litigation-crazed environment in which almost any dispute ends up in court. Overstated as this
perception possibly may be, it is the subjective perception that counts for deterrence purposes.
Accordingly, the apparent paucity of actual enforcement precedents cannot refute the
bonding thesis, because deterrence depends on the actor’s subjective perceptions, not on the actual
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objective risks. All that is necessary for the bonding hypothesis to have a measure of validity is
that the defendant’s perceived risk of liability rises marginally with its entry into the U.S. markets,
not that the SEC or private enforcers will always be omniscient or vigilant policemen. If, as a
result, the controlling persons of the foreign issuer provide superior disclosure or consume less
private benefits of control, even if they do so only marginally upon their firm’s entry into the U.S.,
then the share value of the public shares in such companies should logically rise (and it does). To
be sure, if the deterrent threat were greater, the price rise in the stock of foreign firms listing in the
U.S. might also be greater, but both logic and the evidence support the existence of a correlation.
2. The Noncomparability Problem. A second problem with the simple bonding story may
require greater reformulation of this thesis. Here, the problem is that when we compare firms that
cross-list into the U.S. from any given country with those firms in that same country that do not, we
are essentially comparing apples and oranges. Even prior to their entry into the U.S. markets,
these two classes of firms were different. The Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz study134 with its finding
of a higher Tobin’s q for cross-listing firms reinforces the Pagano, Roell and Zechner study with
its finding of higher leverage and recent rapid expansion by firms cross-listing into the U.S.135
Together, they suggest that firms cross-listing int the U.S. have higher growth prospects (and hence
higher a Tobin’s q).
This apparent finding that firms cross-listing into the U.S. have superior growth prospects
makes obvious sense because it explains a motivation for cross-listing: to obtain the higher
valuations that those growth prospects would command if the issuer’s public statements were
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deemed credible by the market. The firm with such prospects needs the certification that entry into
the U.S. market provides far more than does the firm without such prospects. Also, such an issuer
may need an equity infusion in order to finance those growth prospects, and this will be obtained
with less dilution if the issuer provides its new minority shareholders with superior legal
protections. Both these reasons in turn explain why controlling shareholders might be willing to
forego some private benefits of control: namely, they expect to gain more from enhanced
valuations than they lose in private benefits.
Yet, this interpretation implies that firms cross-listing into the U.S. receive higher
valuations because they have superior growth prospects. The implicit claim by cross-listing firms
of high growth prospects is made credible precisely because the controlling shareholders will be
sacrificing some measure of private benefits. Hence, the positive stock price reaction to crosslisting in the U.S. is not exclusively a reaction to bonding. Rather it is mixed response to bonding
(i.e., superior legal protections) and the implicit signal of superior earnings growth. No simple
formula seems possible by which to allocate the stock price reaction between these two
categories.
This interpretation suggests that the bonding hypothesis explains some of the motivation to
list on a U.S. exchange or Nasdaq, but that we cannot measure with precision the actual price
reaction attributable to bonding.
3. The Market Bubble Explanation. Finally, one last reason for skepticism about bonding
must be at least acknowledged. Some of the motivation to cross-list in the U.S. could be explained
by the claim that the equity market in the United States experienced a bubble during the latter half
of the last decade. On this premise, foreign issuers rushed to cross-list in the U.S. to participate in
stock market valuations not attainable elsewhere (because they were irrational). Although this
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premise could have some partial explanatory power, it cannot easily explain the decade-long
migration of foreign issuers to the U.S. Nor has it been only high-tech firms that have cross-listed.
Finally, high stock market valuations also characterized other markets outside the United States
during this period (emerging markets may have had even more unrealistic valuations prior to the
1997-1998 Asian financial crisis). The bubble hypothesis works only to the extent that there is a
relative disparity in valuations between the U.S. and other markets that cross-listing exploits. At
most then, the bubble hypothesis should lead us to be cautious about how much of the valuation
premium inherent in cross-listing should be attributed to the bonding effect.
III. THE CURRENT COMPETITIVE LANDSCAPE: Can Foreign Markets Compete?
Is the tide toward international (and mainly U.S.) markets irreversible? Or can foreign
markets compete at protecting minority shareholder rights? This section will survey the
institutional and legal developments that will shape and constrain the emerging competition among
securities markets.
A. The Trend Towards Demutualization
Historically, securities exchanges in the U.S. and generally elsewhere have operated as
non-profit mutual or membership organizations. As such, they behaved more like sluggish
monopolies than dynamic entrepreneurs. That pattern is, however, rapidly changing. The first
exchange to demutualize was the Stockholm Stock Exchange in 1993; it was quickly followed by
the Helsinki Stock Exchange in 1995, the Copenhagen Stock Exchange in 1996, the Amsterdam
Stock Exchange and the Borsa Italiana in 1997, and the Australian Stock Exchange in 1998.136
This year, each of the London Stock Exchange, the Deutsche Boerse, and Euronext N.V (itself the
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union of the Paris, Brussels, and Amsterdam stock exchanges) have completed their initial public
offerings, and the Italian Bourse has announced similar plans.137
Within the U.S., Nasdaq has been partially privatized, with its former parent (the NASD)
now owning only a minority equity interest in it (but still holding majority voting control until the
SEC acts on its pending application to covert to the formal status of a stock exchange under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1937). A Nasdaq initial public offering appears likely in the near
future. Alone, the NYSE has not changed. Although it has publicly discussed the possibility of
demutualization, it has backed off this proposal at least for the present, apparently because of
internal tensions.
What will demutualization imply for competition and consolidation? When organized as a
membership or mutual organization, the governance of American stock exchanges generally gave
the specialists and certain market-making members control of the price, quality and range of
services offered by the exchange.138 With demutualization comes a more simplified governance
structure in which the interests of the new shareholders are likely to dominate over those of the
constituent groups within the exchange who formerly exercised veto power. Shareholders in turn
will predictably wish to maximize the share value of their investment, and so will look favorably
both upon acquisition and merger proposals and innovation generally. This does not mean that
such proposals will necessarily be accepted (managements of private corporations in the U.S. and
elsewhere have a long history of blocking them), but the rate of merger and acquisition activity
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seems likely to grow and, independently, the profitability of the exchange will become the
dominant consideration.
B. The Shaky Status of Exchanges Transitional Economies
Of the twenty–six transition economies, stock markets have emerged or been created in
twenty of them, beginning with the Prague Stock Exchange in 1992.139 Typically, the new exchange
in these transitional economies simply listed the shares of all mass-privatized companies. This
was the Czech model, but it produced disastrous results for the credibility of these new exchanges.
Mass listing of all privatized companies produced a very large number of listings, but relatively
thin trading in most of these stocks. Illiquidity in turn invited market manipulation, and a series of
scandals accompanied the early history of exchanges that followed this approach. Ownership of
these firms quickly concentrated, leaving only a small minority float in the public market.
In contrast, in a few transitional markets (most notably, Hungary and Poland), a different
approach to privatization was followed, and fewer companies were listed.140 In these markets, the
principal route to listing was through an initial public offering conducted through the exchange.
While fewer stocks were listed, they enjoyed more liquid trading.
Not surprisingly, the number of listed companies on those exchanges that listed virtually all
mass-privatized companies has subsequently shrunk. Nor have most of these exchanges been able
to provide equity financing. The Prague Stock Exchange still has not seen a single initial public
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offering. 141 This inability to provide equity financing can partly be ascribed to regulatory failures
and a resulting lack of investor confidence in many transitional economies. But this is not the total
explanation. In many Central and Eastern European countries, large firms could obtain bank credit
through political lobbying. 142 The cost of equity was high in comparison to lower-cost debt from
often state-controlled banks, and hence equity financing by already privatized firms were not
sought (in part also because it would dilute the controlling stakes of those running the privatized
firm).
As a result, of the twenty stock markets in transition countries, only four - - Estonia,
Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland - - have market capitalization-to-GDP ratios in excess of
20 percent (which is a standard benchmark that many emerging market countries have
surpassed).143 The average capitalization-to-GDP ratio in transition economies is only 11%.144
Market turnover (defined as the value of trading over market capitalization) is similarly low, with
Hungary (93%), the Czech Republic (81%) and Poland (69%) standing apart and comparing
favorably with Latin American countries.145 The average turnover ratio in the transitional
economies is only 30%.146
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Transitional stock markets are also typically dominated by a few, disproportionately large
firms. The top five percent of listed companies account on average for 75 percent of all turnover
(Poland is a dramatic exception to this pattern, with the top five percent accounting for only 40
percent of all turnover). Indeed, in a number of transitional markets, five or fewer firms account
for 95 percent or more of the total market turnover.147 Hence, if these major firms cross-list on an
international exchange and trading in their stocks predictably follows, the home country exchange
will predictably suffer a major loss of liquidity and will experience higher trading costs with
regard to its remaining stocks (because the exchange’s largely fixed overhead will now have to be
charged against this reduced level of trading).
Consistent with the earlier discussed pattern of dual listings, larger public companies in
transitional economies have listed in the U.S. or on the London Stock Exchange. At the end of
1999, some 72 companies from transitional economies had listed on the NYSE or Nasdaq, and 61
such companies had listed in London. 148 Trading has similarly migrated abroad, with “the number
of shares traded abroad ...[being]... twice as high as the number of shares traded locally.”149 As
local trading dries up, smaller public firms in transitional economies, which would not qualify for
a NYSE listing, have also begun listing on German exchanges, most commonly the Frankfurt. 150
The prospects for many transitional stock markets are not encouraging. A World Bank
study, released in September 2000, predicts that even by the year 2005 and “under the best
possible policy outcomes,” only six of the twenty-six transitional economies will have securities
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markets with market capitalizations equal to twenty-five percent or more of GDP - - a level that is
more or less the median for other emerging markets today. 151 Market turnover is also predicted to
remain low in most transitional economies, with only a minority approaching the 50 percent level
needed to assure liquidity. 152 Low liquidity then seems an endemic problem for these exchanges.
To achieve economies of scale sufficient to produce decreasing costs in the processing of
trades, some estimate that a securities market needs to have a market capitalization in excess of
$15 billion. 153 On this basis, only four transitional economies are likely to reach this point by
2005: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Russia.154 This analysis suggests that trading
costs will remain comparatively high on most smaller markets, further inhibiting their ability to
compete on an international level. In turn, this may motivate issuers on these markets to seek other
trading venues, even if they are not interested in improving their corporate governance.
This bleak picture does not establish that smaller markets will necessarily fail. For
political reasons, including nationalistic pride, some may be subsidized, much as national flag
airlines have been. But the combined impact of demutualization and poor economic prospects
suggest that others will seek alliances, including mergers. Although mergers have been admittedly
rare to this point, a precedent has been set by the three Baltic exchanges (Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania), which have merged and also established a linkage with the Helsinki Stock Exchange.155
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All in all, it is difficult to describe a future for securities exchanges in traditional economies that
does not involve radical consolidation. Even regional exchanges may find it hard to survive - unless they are either (1) subsidized by the state, or (2) establish a “brand name” that attracts
listings.
C. A Success Story?: The Experience of New “High Standards” Markets
The foregoing bleak description of the stock markets in transitional economies suggests that
the odds are stacked formidably high against any new entrant. But two counter-example need to be
considered before a serious evaluation is possible. In both Germany and Brazil, new “high
standards” markets have been recently established by existing exchanges in an effort to halt the
migration of listings and trading to the U.S.
1. The Neuer Markt. Established in 1997 by its parent, the Deutsche Borse, the Neuer
Markt swiftly became Europe’s dominant market for high-growth firms, both in terms of number of
listings and market capitalization. 156 Indeed, in so doing, it has outdistanced earlier established
rivals (such as Easdaq, which eventually was acquired by Nasdaq), and has so far successfully
resisted Nasdaq’s own efforts to achieve dominance in the European market.
Intended as a market for high growth firms, Neuer Markt has adopted a unique style by
advertising itself as “the most regulated market in Europe.”157 Whenever possible, it regularly
stresses its high disclosure and transparency standards, which it has continued to update. Listing
eligibility on the Neuer Markt requires that an issuer: (1) adopt either IAS or US GAAP; (2)
publish quarterly financial reports within two months after each quarter; (3) hold at least one
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analyst conference per year; (4) prepare and publish audited annual financial statements no later
than three months after the end of its fiscal year; (5) have a minimum free float of 20%; (6) adhere
to a six-month lock-up period following its initial public offering before insiders can sell their
shares; and (7) disclose all share transactions by managers, the company, and supervisory board
members.158 In addition, the contents of the required IPO prospectus are also elaborately
specified.159
In substance, these requirements are more rigorous than those specified either by its parent,
the Deutsche Boerse, or, more surprisingly, by the SEC which permits foreign issuers to file only
its Form 20-F. In comparison to the Neuer Markt’s quarterly reporting and tight deadlines, Form
20-F does not require quarterly reporting and permits the issuer to delay until six months after its
fiscal year before filing its annual audited financial report. The Neuer Markt’s strategy appears to
have worked: it has quickly grown from only 2 listed companies in 1997 to 302 in 2000 and
acquired a market capitalization of $172 billion in only three years.160 Only a handful of
exchanges have larger capitalizations.
More recently, however, the Neuer Markt has been plagued by scandals and has seen its
market capitalization slide by 73% from since the end of 1999.161 All this is not surprising for an
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exchange populated with low-priced, high risk stocks. In response, however, the Neuer Markt
tightened its rules, required more disclosure, and adopted standards that will delist an apparently
significant number of firms.162 Even more interestingly, it has done so under pressure from its
larger, more established issuers, which have pressured the Neuer Markt to purge its more
questionable listed firms.163 In economic terms, network externalities appear to link firms traded
on the same principal market and give them a common interest in delisting those who will injure
their common reputation. More importantly, the Neuer Markt’s problems underscore the inevitable
limits on self-regulation. Observers report that many of the scandals plaguing the Neuer Markt
were the product of a shortfall in deterrence attributable to the lack of enforcement of insider
trading restrictions in Germany. 164 In this light, there may be outer limits on the ability of bonding
to work, which are set by the strength of the legal protections in the jurisdiction of listing.
2. The Novo Mercado. If the Neuer Markt was the product of Europe’s desire to emulate
Nasdaq and create an indigenous nursery in which to grow young high-tech companies, Brazil’s
Novo Mercado was the product of the massive migration of local firms to the United States and the
consequent decline in liquidity in Latin America markets.165 The Sao Paulo Stock Exchange
(BOVESPA), Brazil’s largest exchange, was adversely affected by these developments and
perceived the inadequacies in Brazil’s protection of minority shareholders to be a principal factor
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inhibiting the development of its securities market. 166
Frustrated in attempts to secure legislative reform, BOVESPA instead decided to follow
the example of the Neuer Markt. Indeed, it invited U.S. institutional investors to participate in the
design of the listing rules for this new exchange in order to assure that they would be “investor
friendly.”167 Basically, its goal was less to create a specialized incubator for high-tech companies
(of which Brazil had relatively few) than a “high corporate governance” listing section that would
be open only to issuers that voluntarily elected to subscribe to its stricter rules. To maximize its
attractiveness to new issuers, BOVESPA created three special listing segments of its exchange, in
addition to its traditional exchange (whose listing requirements were not changed): Special
Corporate Governance Level 1, Special Corporate Governance Level 2, and the Novo Mercado.168
This creation of four distinct listing segments was essentially a concession to listed firms
that were willing to adopt some reforms, but not all. Level 1 issuers simply agreed to higher
disclosure and transparency standards, but did not revise their corporate governance standards.
Level 2 issuers and those who list on the Novo Mercado obligated themselves to settle
shareholder disputes using a “Market Arbitration Panel,” which represents a new legal remedy in
Brazil. Functionally, this arbitration remedy appears to have been intended as a substitute for
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class actions and derivative actions, which could not have been easily established without
legislation (and, even then, might have been difficult to graft onto Brazil’s highly traditional and
civil law-oriented judicial system). To list on the Novo Mercado, however, the issuer had to
accept major corporate governance reforms and obligate itself to: (1) not issue non-voting shares
and comply with a “one-share, one-vote” rule; (2) maintain a free float equivalent to 25% of the
outstanding stock; (3) grant “tag-along” rights under which all non-controlling shareholders would
be accorded the same right to sell their shares and on the same terms (including price) as were to
be given the controlling shareholder; and (4) elect all directors at an each annual meeting.
Additionally, the issuer agreed to observe heightened disclosure standards, including quarterly
reporting and the use of U.S. GAAP or IAS accounting standards. On the practical level, the
leading differences between Level 2 and the Novo Mercado were that an issuer who listed only on
the former could still utilize non-voting shares and its controlling shareholders would not be
required to share control premia.
The Novo Mercado’s listing rules were officially announced in December 2000, but it was
not until February, 2002 that the first (and still the only) company listed on it. 169 As of April 2002,
some nineteen companies have listed on Level 1 (which does not require any revisions in
substantive corporate governance), but none have listed on Level 2 (although a few companies
have announced their intention to do so after obtaining shareholder approval of the requisite
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corporate governance changes).
What does this weak (or at least equivocal) response suggest about the desire to bond? At
a minimum, it implies that a new exchange or listing segment will face difficulty in competing with
the stronger “reputational brand” of the NYSE. Firms who list on the NYSE also obtain the
practical ability to effect an initial public offering, while the feasibility of such an offering remains
in doubt in Brazil. Such “high standards” exchanges may therefore appeal only to firms who do
not qualify for an NYSE listing or who find the expenses associated with cross-listing to be
prohibitive Yet, it is noteworthy (and perhaps ironic) that the Novo Mercado has essentially
leapfrogged the NYSE by precluding the use of non-voting shares (while the NYSE continues to
list foreign firms with non-voting classes of stock).
D. The “New” Regulatory Competition
The Novo Mercado was essentially a response by the BOVESPA to the inability of Brazil
to enact meaningful corporate governance reform legislation. 170 Yet, since 2000, the major Latin
America markets - - Brazil, Chile and Mexico - - have enacted significant corporate governance
reform legislation, after decades of inaction. 171 Mexico supplies the best illustration of this
common pattern. As earlier noted, Mexico experienced a migration of listings and trading volume
to the NYSE that was at least as significant as that experienced by Brazil. 172 In response, in April
2002, pursuant to earlier enacted legislation delegating the requisite power to them, Mexico’s
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National Commission on Banking and Securities, in combination with the Mexican Stock Exchange
and the Mexican Association of Market Intermediaries, substantially revised its rules on tender
offers in order to strengthen the rights of minority shareholders and accord them a proportionate
share of control premiums.173 Under this reform, non-voting shares now enjoy full “tag-along”
rights in the event of takeover offers. Specifically, the new rules require that all purchases of
between 30 and 50 percent of the voting stock must be accompanied by a tender offer for all shares
classes at the same price, and all offers to acquire more than 50 percent of the voting stock must be
accompanied by a tender offer for 100 percent of all shares in all classes.174 While the rules do
not prohibit nonvoting shares, they were intended to create an ncentive to cause issuers to abandon
their existing structure of multiple share classes, and some issuers have already responded by
doing so.175 In turn, the goal of this effort was to make “local and foreign investors feel more
secure about investing in Mexican equities.”176
Still, the irony in the Mexican experience is that, while the benefits of improved corporate
governance will be principally felt by Mexican firms (which in theory should be able to raise
more equity and at lower cost with improved governance), the impetus for these reforms has come
not from Mexican corporations (which could have adopted them voluntarily), but from the Mexican
securities industry (which was the principal loser from cross-listings). The indifference or even
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hostility of Mexican firms to corporate governance reform is understandable, because improved
governance implies reduced private benefits of control, and controlling shareholders may
anticipate that these lost benefits will exceed the value to them of any improvement in their firm’s
stock price. Nonetheless, political reforms may come for the unexpected reason that the
controlling shareholders’ self-interest eclipses the local securities market in a globalizing world.
IV. HOW MARKETS WILL COMPETE: Rival Scenarios
To this point, it has been argued that world of securities markets is in flux: exchanges are
privatizing; issuers are cross-listing; some markets may fail; and others may consolidate by any of
several techniques. Finally, the latest development is that some legislatures are responding to the
loss of trading to international exchanges by enacting reform legislation. But will this new
competition produce a race to the top or to the bottom? As next examined, a plausible case can be
made for either scenario.
A. The “Race to the Top” Scenario
The case for governance reform as a strategy to increase the competitiveness of a market
center is easily made. Although comparative studies of corporate governance in the United States
have not been able to correlate “higher” standards of governance with improved market value, the
reverse has been true in the case of emerging markets. Several studies have shown that firms with
higher quality governance have higher market values.177 Similarly, the cost of capital appears to
be lower for firms that make fuller disclosure. For example, a study by Pricewaterhouse Coopers
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of eight Asian countries found that the lack of transparency increases the cost of capital: 233 basis
points on average for Hong Kong companies, and 1,316 basis points in the case of mainland
Chinese companies.178 In contrast, Singapore-based companies incurred no basis points penalty in
this study, apparently because of the higher transparency in its market. 179 The apparent lesson for
Asian companies based on this study is that they may be able to reduce their cost of capital by
listing on the Singapore Stock Exchange (or another high transparency exchange). Similarly, a
study conducted in 2000 by Credit Lyonnais found that, between 1997 and 2000, emerging market
companies having highly rated corporate governance practices rose an average of 370 percent (as
against an average of 170 percent for the overall average of public companies incorporated in
these countries over this period).180 If these studies are correct, “good” corporate governance may
pay for itself.
Some finance theorists have argued that traders, in addition to issuers, will also prefer
“high disclosure” exchanges. Huddart, Hughes and Brunnermeier claim that liquidity traders will
opt to trade on high-disclosure exchanges and that informed traders (i.e., those possessing material
non-public information) will follow them in order to “exploit the disguise afforded by the greater
depth on that exchange.”181
The “race to the top” scenario must face, however, some important objections. First,
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exchanges may not benefit by establishing themselves as high quality, “high disclosure” exchanges
if the trading in the foreign issuers that list on these exchange still flows back to the issuer’s home
country exchange. Such flow back is common, as shown by the DaimlerChrysler experience,182
and it may accelerate as firms come to replace ADRs with global shares that can settle in either
country.183 If a foreign issuer can list on the NYSE, and yet the majority of the trading in its stock
eventually flows back to the issuer’s home country exchange, the NYSE gains less from such a
listing than from a comparable domestic listing. 184 This may explain why the NYSE has long been
more willing to waive listing requirements that it applies to domestic issuers in the case of foreign
issuers.185 Because both it and its dealers gain less from such a listing and because the NYSE must
compete with a foreign exchange for trading volume, the NYSE logically has less incentive to
pursue or monitor foreign listings.
Second, the increase in stock value associated with listing on a “high disclosure” exchange
may mean little to controlling shareholders, who are more focused on retaining the private benefits
of control, as next discussed.
B. The “Race to the Bottom” Scenario.
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For example, the NYSE has long sought to convince the SEC to permit it to list
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(citing SEC Exchange Act Rel. No. 24,634 (June 23, 1987)).
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The alternative perspective begins with the recognition that firms with controlling
shareholders may not wish to upgrade their disclosure or governance practices because controlling
shareholders enjoy (and do not wish to reduce) high private benefits of control. For controlling
shareholders, what is particularly important is the ability to receive a control premium that is
based on their participation in the firm’s voting rights, rather than on their typically lower
participation in the firm’s cash flow.186 On any given exchange outside the U.S. and the U.K., firms
with controlling shareholders are likely to be in the majority and would be able to outvote those
firms that wished to upgrade the local exchange’s governance or disclosure requirements if these
reforms seemed likely to challenge their ability to receive the traditional private benefits of
control. Even a privatized exchange would be unlikely to seek to raise its governance standards
for listed companies if this effort were likely to cause the delisting of a significant number of
listed companies. Hence, a powerful coalition of entrenched forces appears ready to resist
governance reform in most markets.
Dealers also may have little innate desire to upgrade transparency or disclosure standards.
One recent study notes recent examples in which non-transparent exchanges seem to have
dominated transparent ones.187 In particular, the London Stock Exchange was able to outcompete
the Paris Bourse for large block traders by permitting dealers to delay the reporting of such block

186

Hence, so-called “tag along” rights profoundly restrict the controlling
shareholder’s ability to receive such a control premium based on its voting power
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transactions for as much as several days.188 So much of the block trade volume migrated from
Paris to London that the Paris Bourse was eventually compelled to change its trade reporting rules
to match those of London.
These objections do not imply, however, that the world will remain static; rather, they
suggest that there are institutional rigidities which reforms will have to accommodate.
C. Combining the Scenarios: A Mixed World of High and Low Disclosure
Assume for a moment that the controlling shareholders of many listed issuers outside the
U.S. and the U.K. would prefer to enjoy the private benefits of control, rather than maximize their
market valuations through bonding. On this assumption, can additional “high disclosure” markets
emerge? Of course, we have already witnessed the appearance of a “high disclosure” exchange in
Europe and Latin America in the form of the Neuer Markt and the Novo Mercado.189 But their
creation proves this point that old markets will resist change. Precisely because the Deutsche
Boerse, the parent of the Neuer Markt, and BOVESPA, the parent of the Novo Mercado, were
unwilling or unable to upgrade significantly their own listing standards, they instead founded new
markets, in one case as a wholly-owned subsidiary and in the other as a special listing section. In
so doing, they offered an additional alternative to their clients without forcing any listed firm to
change its governance or face delisting. This approach is likely to be repeated.
For those firms that do list on a Neuer Markt, Novo Mercado, or some similar infant
exchange, the rationale for listing will be essentially that the expected gains to their controlling
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shareholders from being able to finance “high growth” investment opportunities with equity capital
exceed the expected losses in foregone private benefits of control. Typically, cross-listing firms
will be companies with high growth prospects that require equity capital because they are already
highly leveraged.190 Pagano, Roell and Zechner report that this was basically the profile of
European firms that cross-listed in the United States during the 1986 to 1997 period that they
studied.191
High growth prospects are not the only reason that a firm might migrate to a “high
disclosure” exchange, even at the cost to its controlling shareholders of foregoing some of the
private benefits of control that they previously enjoyed. An alternative scenario starts from the
fact that, as the worldwide barriers to product market competition have fallen, firms are
increasingly forced either to grow to global scale or to accept the fate of being acquired by a
competitor.192 For example, an auto maker based in Sweden or Germany was faced with the
choice, after the integration of the European market, of either expanding its activities to a
European-wide scale or expecting that its rivals that did so would soon dwarf it and realize
probable economies of scale and scope. The most ambitious firms in the industry might even
expand to become world-wide manufacturers (as clearly some U.S., German, and Japanese
producers have done). In this process of expansion to global scale, the quickest, most logical
mechanism for expansion is the cross-border merger or acquisition. This scenario principally fits
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many European firms that have recently cross-listed in the U.S., while in contrast emerging markets
firms that have cross-listed have been generally smaller and more motivated by the desire to
finance high growth opportunities.
On this playing field of cross-border mergers, firms with dispersed ownership that are
listed on “high disclosure” exchanges have a distinct advantage. Their stock will predictably
trade at less of a discount to reflect the lesser prospect of expropriation by controlling
shareholders. Other things being equal, they will find it easier to make acquisitions with equity
securities. To be sure, firms with concentrated ownership can make acquisitions for cash, but
there may be a ceiling on magnitude of cash acquisitions that are feasible. For example, one has
difficulty imagining Daimler acquiring Chrysler for $50 billion in cash, and hence the prior
decision of Daimler to list on the New York Stock Exchange may have been a necessary
prerequisite to this transaction being accomplished. Other recent large acquisitions (including
British Petroleum’s 1999 acquisition of Amoco for $48 billion, Ford’s purchase of Volvo, and the
Exxon/Mobil merger) seem also to strain the limits of practical finance if these were attempted as
cash transactions. The point is not simply that stock for stock acquisitions are easier, but that firms
that maximize the value of their publicly held shares can make acquisitions at less dilutive cost to
themselves. As a result, firms listed on “high disclosure” exchanges are more likely to be the
survivors and acquirers, rather than the targets, in the wave of acquisitions that the drive for global
scale entails. In fact, the parade of large German firms recently listing on the New York Stock
Exchange evidences this fact that corporations seeking global scale see the need for a listing on a
“high disclosure” exchange.193
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Id. at 677 and n. 129.
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Even if “high disclosure” exchanges can thus attract listings from high growth or
acquisition-oriented companies and even if some controlling shareholders would willingly
abandon some private benefits of control to achieve these ends, one practical issue remains: Has
the U.S. already monopolized the market for “high disclosure” exchanges? The weak response to
the creation of the Novo Mercado may suggest that other new entrants will similarly find it hard to
compete against the strong “reputational brands” of the NYSE and Nasdaq. Still, a residual market
may remain to the extent that many issuers cannot satisfy the listing standards of the NYSE or
Nasdaq or find a U.S. listing too costly. 194
In this light, regional “super-markets” might develop from exchanges that already had
relatively high disclosure standards and could offer greater credibility to companies incorporated
in jurisdictions perceived by investors as having weak governance standards. Conversely, firms
less interested in attracting minority investors (but still desiring some degree of liquidity) might
trade only on lower-disclosure exchanges (such as the Korean or Shanghai Stock Exchanges).
This prediction has two implications: First, high and low disclosure exchanges could both
persist, each attracting a different core constituency of issuers. Second, the fiercest competition
will likely be between those regional exchanges that aspire to attract dual listings from issuers
originally listed on smaller exchanges (for example, the Australian and Singapore exchanges in
Asia and the London Stock Exchange and Euronext in Europe are natural competitors). Although
single country exchanges will probably endure in large market countries (e.g., Korea in Asia or
Milan in Italy), they seem likely to progressively lose trading volume to the regional “super-
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market.” Exchanges in small market countries (i.e., many of the transitional stock exchanges) will
either close, consolidate, or be subsidized by the state. Whatever the outcome, they will lose
liquidity.
If some exchanges wish to upgrade their disclosure standards to attract listings (or to
organize a subsidiary market that does so), what specific reforms should they adopt? The Neuer
Markt has already shown that quarterly reporting and use of U.S. or International GAAP can be
required. Beyond these obvious requirements, institutional investors will probably most want “tag
along” rights: namely, the right to share on proportionate terms in any control premium. Both the
recent Mexican reforms and a similar, although largely unsuccessful, legislative struggle in Brazil
indicate that this is the corporate governance reform that most divides controlling shareholders and
institutional shareholders.195 Effectively, conferring this right reduces the significance of the
disparity between cash flow and voting rights that characterize many firms in emerging markets.196
Is it realistic to expect exchanges outside the Untied States to attempt to adopt anything
resembling the NYSE’s old “one share, one vote” rule? Although both the Novo Mercado and the
Mexican Stock Exchange have done so, it is uncertain whether others will follow. Put differently,
so long as the NYSE will allow foreign firms to list their non-voting shares on it, there may be
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72

little willingness on the part of cross-listing foreign firms to upgrade their substantive corporate
governance.
D. Other Competitors: Who Else Can Offer Bonding Services?
Even if there is a demand for “bonding” services, those willing to offer it must compete
with both the principal international exchanges and any new entrants, other than exchanges, who
could also provide such services. But who else could enter this field? Phrased differently, can
anyone other than an exchange credibly assure investors that a foreign corporation possessed
adequate corporate governance to protect minority investors from expropriation? The answer is
almost certainly yes, but whether such new entrants will in fact emerge is very speculative.
One conceivable candidate to challenge the traditional exchange might seem to be the
“electronic communications network ” or “ECN,”197 but it is unlikely to perform this role.
Although these electronic markets have captured an impressive share of overall trading volume,
they have essentially followed an old competitive strategy: free ride on the price discovery
process conducted by traditional exchanges but offer lower-cost and faster executions.198 This
strategy may capture trading volume, but free-riding does not position ECNs to offer bonding
services or other reputational benefits. First, ECNs do not have listing standards of their own, but
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simply trade stocks that are listed elsewhere. Second, because ECN are not good liquidity
providers, they cannot cope with large blocks because they have little capacity to adjust their
prices for such blocks or, more generally, to handle price discovery when a large block hits the
market. As a result, ECNs are likely to be only a secondary market, and not the primary market,
for most companies. In particular, ECNs are unsuited to handle companies that trade inactively or
sporadically because ECNs only provide matching of buy and sell orders and not the residual
liquidity offered by dealers or specialists.
The real significance of ECNs is that they represent one more competitor that can trade
securities that are listed on a “high quality” exchange. Thus, as in the earlier discussed case of
trading that flows back to the home country, ECNs erode the incentive for an exchange to invest in
reputational capital or to maintain high listing standards if the exchange cannot fully capture the
trading in that security. 199 For example, if a foreign corporation were to list on the New York
Stock Exchange but still trade 50% on its home country exchange and 25% on ECNs, then the
NYSE might well have conferred a reputational benefit on the foreign company, but it would
capture only 25% of the trading in this example. This mismatch means the NYSE may be underrewarded for the benefits that it in fact provides to the foreign-listed company and hence has only a
limited incentive to market bonding services to such companies.
In this light, the greater potential challenge to exchanges will more likely come not from
ECNs, but from investment banking firms. In overview, the most realistic alternative to the
contemporary pattern of corporate issuers cross-listing on international exchanges is for large,
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world-class brokerage firms to cross borders to search out attractive investments for their
clients.200 Potentially, either the issuer on the sell side or the broker on the buy side can today
cross borders to link investors with issuers. If brokers will do so, issuers can stay at home and
avoid the costs of cross-listing. Thus, the issue from a transaction cost perspective becomes: who
can cross borders more cheaply?
Because cross-listing can be expensive (both in terms of listing expenses and the
reconciliation of financial statements), the intuitive answer to this question would seem to be that
the broker can cross borders more cheaply than can issuers.201 Moreover, the broker has a natural
ally: namely, the traditional exchange that is today faced with the risk that it will lose substantial
order flow to a more liquid market when its listed companies cross-list elsewhere. The logical
strategy for these traditional exchanges that cannot or will not upgrade their corporate governance
standards is to solicit international brokerage firms to trade on them by making themselves
cheaper, and hence more attractive, to these brokerage firms. Rather than raise listing standards,
such exchanges could seek to reduce costs to attract international brokers and thereby similarly
break down market segmentations.
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foreign securities accessible to investors within their jurisdiction. Professor
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Jackson and Pan, supra note 13, at 655. Thus, rather than a French issuer listing on
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for its stock on the Paris Bourse through French brokers for its British retail
investors. Id. at 656n.2.
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But even if such an alliance is possible, what relevance does it have for any future
competition to provide bonding services? The answer is that brokerage firms could potentially
provide the assurances that foreign portfolio investors demand through the stable of securities
analysts that they employ. This strategy would require, first, that the foreign firm adopt charter
and/or bylaw provisions that protected minority shareholders, including a commitment to “high”
disclosure, and, second, that securities analysts be capable of verifying the adequacy of such
private, self-help efforts. If this is possible, foreign firms would not need to cross-list; instead,
global brokerage firms would focus the attention of their securities analysts on selected foreign
stocks that they expected to trade globally. This scenario is plausible precisely because analyst
attention has long been a key attraction luring foreign issuers to list on U.S. exchanges. On crosslisting, foreign firms receive greater analyst coverage and forecasts of their future earnings become
correspondingly more accurate relative to those made with respect to firms that do not cross-list. 202
These are important advantages to the firm, but to the extent that such analyst attention can be
achieved without cross-listing, the foreign issuer has an obvious incentive to use the less costly
alternative in order to bond its implicit promise not to expropriate minority investors. In short,
analyst attention and cross-listing are not inextricably linked, and the former can potentially be
achieved without the latter. If so, an alliance between brokers and foreign firms to trade on less
costly exchanges offers gains to both and thus constitutes the gravest threat to more costly, “high
disclosure” exchanges.
This potential approach does, however, shift costs in a manner that may not necessarily be

202

See Mark Lang, Karl Lins, and Darius Miller, ADRs, Analysts and Accuracy: Does
Cross-Listing in the U.S. Improve a Firm’s Information Environment and Increase
Market Value? (Working Paper March 2002).
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attractive to the brokerage firm. Although the issuer avoids the costs of both establishing a
depository receipts facility in the U.S. and listing on a U.S. exchange, the broker incurs (and must
pass on to some degree to its customers) the costs of foreign execution, clearance, and settlement.
On the other side of the ledger, however, the broker captures trading that might have otherwise
gone to an ECN if the firm had instead cross-listed in the U.S. Hence, although the broker may
incur some increased costs, the net balance is uncertain. Over the long run, cost difference should
be determinative, and any cost differential favoring brokers should reduce the issuer’s incentive to
cross-list. This point has a further implication: if the driving force behind cross-listing were only
the desire to break down market segmentation, one would logically expect that the cheaper means
to this end would be through international executions by a global brokerage firm, not by the issuer
listing globally. In this light, the trend toward cross-listing again suggests that the market
segmentation hypothesis cannot fully explain this phenomenon.
A further difference between bonding through cross-listing and the use of international
brokerage firms to design and verify corporate governance reforms on an individualized basis is
that, in the latter case, the issuer does not expose itself to litigation in the United States (either by
private plaintiffs or by the SEC). This difference poses the currently unanswerable question of
whether bonding can occur in the absence of a strong enforcement mechanism. Clearly, issuers
would prefer to offer the promise of better disclosure without also incurring the heightened risk of
litigation. But can issuers have one without the other? Those who doubt that securities class
actions achieve much will argue that it can, and those who disagree will note that this alternative
means to bonding has never developed (even though it may be cheaper). At present, whether
bonding requires exposure to litigation is another unanswerable question.
Subject to this caveat, the bottom line is that rival strategies are possible and thus may lead
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exchanges increasingly to polarize and signal very different strategies. Some exchanges will “race
for the top” in the manner of the Neuer Market and the Novo Mercado, while others should
increasingly pursue a cost-minimization strategy. Those opting for the latter approach may focus
also on speed of settlement and seek a reputation for relative regulatory “flexibility.”
Conceivably, issuers that did cross-list on a “high quality” exchange might also deliberately
maintain their listing on a lower quality market in order to escape regulatory oversight for some
transactions that their controlling shareholders wish to engage in.
Part V. POLICY ISSUES: How Should Regulatory Competition Be Structured?
The efforts by emerging markets to develop new “high disclosure” markets and to upgrade
their corporate governance standards is motivated both by the obvious desire to spur economic
development and by the equally obvious fear that, in the absence of reform, their securities markets
will wither away, as trading migrates to international exchanges. These efforts are complicated,
however, by a long-standing position of the U.S. exchanges and the SEC: they do not require
foreign firms that list in the U.S. to satisfy the same listing requirements as domestic firms. As a
result, when a foreign market, such as the Novo Mercado seeks to upgrade its governance
standards, it encounters resistance (or at least apathy) from its audience of potential listed
companies that know they can list in the U.S. and obtain both greater liquidity and lower
governance requirements. The unwillingness of U.S. exchanges to impose governance or voting
listing requirements on foreign listed firms thus surfaces as a barrier to improved governance in
emerging markets; indeed, it may create a perverse form of regulatory competition in which U.S.
exchanges in effect underbid their competitors in terms of substantive governance requirements.
This section will first examine the special status of foreign listed companies on U.S. exchanges
and then turn to the broader question of regulatory competition.
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A. The Domestic/Foreign Listing Disparity
Listing standards were pioneered by the NYSE as a means of creating for itself “a brand
name associated with high quality.”203 While its early listing standards primarily related to
financial disclosures, the NYSE began to adopt substantive corporate governance standards in the
early 20th Century and effectively imposed its famous “one share, one vote listing standard” in
1926.204 Over time, the NYSE has similarly adopted listing rules requiring (i) an independent
audit committee,205 (ii) shareholder approval of certain stock option plans,206 and (iii) shareholder
approval of issuances of 20 percent or more of a listed company’s common stock in order to
protect shareholders against dilutive issuances.207 Today, both the NYSE and Nasdaq restrict
listed companies from disparately reducing or restricting, through any corporate action or stock
issuance, the voting rights of existing shareholders of common stock. 208 All of these provisions
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were intended to protect minority shareholders, and most go beyond the requirements of state
corporate law.
Yet, under each of the NYSE, Amex and Nasdaq rules foreign issuers are effectively
exempt from these rules.209 Moreover, the SEC has approved this disparity. 210 Why has this
disparity between foreign and domestic listings developed? The principal reason was probably
that, at the time the SEC approved this distinction in 1987, foreign issuers represented only a small
fraction of both the securities listed or traded on U.S. exchanges.211 Thus, if only 5% of a foreign
company’s stock traded on all U.S. exchanges, it seemed disproportionate to require such a firm to
observe the NYSE’s “one share, one vote” rule; indeed, application of such a rule might
discourage foreign listings. Additionally, there was an inevitable issue of cultural relativism: if
foreign corporations frequently used non-voting stock or if they did not believe that audit
committees were compatible with the two-tier board structure common to most civil law countries,
the SEC and the NYSE seemed less justified in instructing these firms to abandon their local
corporate governance practices than in imposing local best practices on domestic firms. Given
these arguments, foreign issuers were permitted to obtain a waiver from most NYSE corporate
governance listing requirements, so long as an independent attorney licensed in the issuer’s home

209

See ABA Special Study at 26-27.

210

See Exchange Act Release No. 24,634, 52 Fed. Reg. 24230 (June 23, 1987)
(“Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes by the American Stock Exchange, Inc.
and the New York Stock Exchange Inc. to Amend the Exchanges’ Listing Standards
for Foreign Companies”).

211

See text and notes at notes 32 to 42 (contrasting percentages in 1990 and 2000).
Also, investors who purchased ADRs were thought to care little about voting
rights, because such rights were procedurally difficult to exercise in the case of
ADRs.
80

country opined that the firm’s governance practices were not prohibited in its home jurisdiction. 212
Even at this time, the result was a sharp disparity between the NYSE’s mandatory
approach to domestic firms and its laissez-faire approach to foreign firms. Since that point,
however, much has changed. Foreign issuers now account for over 15% of the NYSE listings, not
the 2% to 3% level in the 1980's.213 More importantly, many foreign issuers now trade principally
in the United States.214 For these issuers, the burden no longer seems disproportionate. In
addition, if the purpose of the these listings rules is investor protection, it is hard to understood
why investors trading on U.S. exchanges need or deserve more protection in the case of U.S.incorporated companies and less in the case of foreign-incorporated issuers. If anything, the latter
class of companies presents higher risks. Finally, exempting all foreign issuers on an across-theboard basis undercuts the efforts of those foreign exchanges, including both Novo Mercado and the
Mexican Stock Exchange, that are now seeking to upgrade corporate governance through higher
listing standards, as this exemption enables the foreign issuer to evade all governance-related
standards by listing on a U.S. exchange.
Nonetheless, the appropriate reform need not require treating all foreign issuers identically
with U.S. companies. Rather, the appropriate test might look to the volume of trading in the U.S.
If the foreign issuer has a higher level of trading in the U.S. than on any non-U.S. exchange,215 then
such an issuer should not be able to escape U.S. listing standards that are intended to protect the
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investors who trade on U.S. exchanges. Conversely, if the issuer listed ADRs on the NYSE that
account for, say, only 10% of its total trading, the U.S. has less justification for seeking to impose
its standards on a security that has only a limited presence in U.S. markets. This proposed
standard also recognizes that there could someday develop conflicts between what exchanges in
different jurisdictions require, thereby making it impossible to comply with both.
Above all, this approach would end the prospect that U.S. exchanges could become a
haven for firms willing to make higher and more detailed disclosure, but still seeking to utilize
non-voting stock in order to preserve the private benefits of control for its controlling
shareholders.
B. Regulatory Competition Reconsidered
This article has recognized that some forms of regulatory competition may be desirable.
For example, the higher disclosure and governance standards adopted by both the Neuer Markt and
the Novo Mercado are clearly the product of a competitive desire to attract listings. In addition,
recent legislation adopted in Mexico and elsewhere seems clearly intended to upgrade local
corporate governance in order to stem the migration of trading and listings abroad.216 But if this
form of regulatory competition is desirable, why should we not go further and adopt the “issuer
choice” approach that several commentators have endorsed under which an issuer could trade on
any exchange using the disclosure and governance standards of any recognized jurisdiction? 217
This article will give three brief reasons for rejecting “issuer choice” and then describe an
alternative model to issuer choice that it calls “exit-less” regulatory competition:
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1. Complementarity. Because investors do not evaluate individual stocks in isolation, but
rather compare them, it is desirable that any market have a set of common standards and rules that
facilitates investor comparison. Under “issuer choice,” one U.S.-incorporated company could
adopt Italian accounting and disclosure standards; another Greek; and a third Korean. While each
set of standards may be internally consistent, they are not externally comparable. Hence, these
three companies could have performed very similarly, but appear very different. The claim here is
not that one set of accounting standards is necessarily superior to another, but that a common
standard is better than diverse and non-comparable standards.218 Similarly, the spread of English
as the language of business does not reflect the natural superiority of English, but rather the natural
desirability of a common standard language. To be sure, markets can function without such a
common standard, but they are less transparent and more costly for investors to use.
2. Strong Laws Encourage Economic Development. The available empirical evidence
suggest that adopting and enforcing a prohibition against insider trading significantly reduces the
cost of capital.219 Such a finding is consistent with the broader proposition advanced by LLS&V
and others that strong laws protecting minority investors are a precondition to financial
development. 220 Given this evidence, consider now the impact of the “issuer choice” approach to
securities regulation. If issuers could opt to be governed by a non-U.S. legal regime, even though
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they were listed on the NYSE, some might well opt for the law of a jurisdiction that does not
prohibit insider trading. Proponents of “issuer choice” will, of course, respond that an issuer that
did so would be penalized by the market and would experience an appropriate discount in its share
value. Perhaps, it would.221 But this does not respond to the more basic point that an externality
has arisen: the immunity conferred on some firms to engage in insider trading may affect the cost of
equity capital for all firms trading in that market. Rather than research the laws of numerous
jurisdictions, investors may simply assume that they were vulnerable to insiders misappropriating
material, nonpublic information and adjust prices downward in response. Moreover, there is also
the prospect that the ability of some persons to engage in lawful insider trading may induce others
to similarly engage in this behavior, even if it were illegal in their case. In effect, the moral
foundations of the norm against insider trading are undercut. 222
3. Reputational Brands. The foregoing example involving insider trading can be
generalized to apply to most other forms of disclosure deficiencies. If some firms are permitted to
trade in the market making less than the prescribed level of disclosure, there is a potential effect on
other issuers, who may incur a higher cost of equity capital as a result. Essentially, this is why the
NYSE developed listing standards, beginning in the late 19th Century. Put simply, it recognized
that to develop a “reputational brand,” it had to exclude those unwilling or unable to comply with
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The author has argued elsewhere that normative consensus may be the critical
factor underlying “strong” corporate governance. See John Coffee, Do Norms
Matter? A Cross-Country Evaluation, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2151 (2001).
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its “high quality” standards.223 In short, issuer choice is incompatible with the idea of a market
developing a “high standards” reputation. Yet, ironically, only those markets that have developed
such a brand name have developed into major international market centers with deep liquidity.
Where then does the dividing line lie between desirable and undesirable forms of
regulatory competition? Proponents of “issuer choice” favor a form of regulatory arbitrage that is
designed to allow firms to escape undesired regulation. Such an approach makes sense from a
policy perspective only if one believes firms are systematically subject to overregulation. 224 Yet,
the form of regulatory competition that one actually observes today and that is inherent in crosslisting involves opting into higher standards (at least in the case of disclosure rules). This form of
regulatory competition can be called “exit-less,” because the issuer does not escape its home
jurisdiction laws and rules. That is, even if the market center to which the issuer cross-lists has
lower disclosure standards, the issuer will still be required to make disclosures to its home
jurisdiction regulator. This form of competition can involve bonding, but not a regulatory
arbitrage designed to weaken legal rules. At best, it is desirable; at worst, it is benign.
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See John Coffee, The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the
State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 Yale L. J. 1, at 34-39
(2001).
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The “issuer choice” model derives from a theoretical model of jurisdictional
competition for citizens. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local
Expenditures, 64 J. Pol. Econ. 416 (1956). This model assumes that the
“consumer-voter” moves to the jurisdiction that best matches this citizen’s
preferences for expenditures and taxes. Obviously, citizens are deterred by high
taxes, and thus the threat of citizen flight deters high taxation. Unlike the citizens in
this model, corporations do not truly leave their jurisdiction when they cross-list on
a foreign exchange. Rather, their shares typically continue to trade on their home
exchange, and they continue to do business in their home jurisdiction, where they
have many shareholders. Because they thus make a “pseudo flight” to a foreign
jurisdiction, they are not comparable to the actors in a Tiebout-style model, and
efficient outcomes do not necessarily result.
85

CONCLUSION
One underlying question that has not yet been squarely faced unites many of the themes
considered in this article: How much does law matter? This article’s answer is that law matters a
lot - - but only to some. The cross-listing phenomenon that accelerated during the 1990's shows
that many firms do wish to upgrade their corporate governance and for an easily understood
reason: to gain access to equity capital, either to finance high growth investment opportunities that
could not be financed domestically or to facilitate strategic mergers and acquisitions. Yet other
firms that have not cross-listed appear to be indifferent to this prospect of higher market valuation,
and again it is for an understandable reason: because higher market valuation would be offset by
reduced private benefits of control to their controlling shareholders. The firms that do and do not
cross-list appear then to be as different as proverbial apples and oranges. As a result, different
forms of securities markets, each catering to a different clientele, appear likely to persist.
Ambiguity still surrounds the precise cause of the increase in market valuation associated
with cross-listing: is it the higher likelihood of legal enforcement, the more credible promise of
improved disclosure, the enhanced analyst coverage - - or all in combination? All in all, crosslisting may in part be a signaling device that the firm has high growth prospects, in part a bonding
mechanism to assure public investors that they will not be exploited, and in part a means of
attaining greater analyst attention and reducing informational asymmetries. Our understanding of
the motives that drive it is far from complete. Yet, cross-listing cannot continue to be
satisfactorily explained simply as simply a search for additional sources of capital in a segmented
world.
In an increasingly competitive and consolidating environment, stock exchanges and other
market centers will come under increasing pressure to specialize. Some will move toward the
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high disclosure, high transparency approach that both the NYSE historically and the Neuer Markt
more recently have pursued, while others may persist in following the low transparency, cost
minimization approach that most European and Asian stock exchanges have traditionally followed.
This article has suggested that different exchanges will move in different directions because of a
basic path dependent fact: they have different clienteles of listed companies. The one destabilizing
prospect on the horizon is that legislation in many jurisdiction may begin to upgrade governance
standards in order to slow the migration of trading.
That legislative reforms have been provoked by cross-listings is an example of a new form
of regulatory competition in which issuers opt into higher standards without seeking to escape their
local jurisdiction’s law. Such competition seems desirable, but it is impeded by the increasingly
anomalous distinction that U.S. law makes between foreign and domestic issuers, applying
governance standards to the latter, but not the former. Although this article has not advocated
specific governance requirements for any class of issuers, it would argue that functionally similar
rules should apply to both foreign and domestic issuers that principally trade in the U.S. In
contrast, issuer choice represents a form of competition that would largely undercut the ability of
markets to develop their own reputational brands.
Finally, precisely because exchanges do not today capture the full value of the bonding
services that they provide to issuers (both because of trading flow back and other reasons that
divert trading away from exchanges), the market for bonding services can fail. Thus, there is a
case for regulatory oversight to protect and preserve the reputational benefits of exchange listing.
The “race to the top” via cross-listing should be encouraged - - but it will slow if “issuer choice”
is permitted.
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